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Philosophy

An Examination o f Revisionist Theories in Criminal Insanity Jurisprudence
Director; Tom H u f f " ~ ^ \
The criminal insanity defense is a controversial area in the criminal law. One case in
particular that exemplifies its controversial nature is that of Andrea Yates, the Texas
woman who in 2001 drowned her five children. Under the Texas test for criminal
insanity, which asks whether or not the defendant “knew right from wrong.” a jury found
Yates guilty o f first-degree murder. However, as it has been voiced in the media in the
weeks after the verdict, many thoughtful people find this verdict wrong.
This paper examines alternative tests for criminal insanity to those that are currently
found in the criminal law, including that o f Texas, in the hopes of finding a better test for
determining criminal insanity. The alternative tests that are examined in this paper, are
those o f the philosophers Herbert Fingarette and Lawrie Reznek. Specifically,
Fingarette’s and Reznek's tests are examined from the perspective o f five important
issues that have occupied scholars in criminal insanity jurisprudence, as well some o f the
problems that have characteristically given rise to these issues. Finally, once Fingarette’s
and Reznek’s tests for insanity are examined, they are applied to the case of Andrea
Yates. According to Fingarette’s and Reznek’s tests, Yates should have been found not
guilty by reason o f insanity.
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I. Introduction
The insanity defense in the Anglo-American criminal law system is unusually
controversial, indeed so controversial that it is sometimes thought o f as presenting an
intractable problem. ' A very recent example that illustrates the controversial character o f
the insanity defense comes from the trial o f Andrea Yates, a case which has received
widespread attention from the media since we first learned o f her horrific actions. ^
On the Morning o f June 20,2001 the public learned that Yates had systematically
drowned her five children, ages 2-7, in a bathtub inside her home; and that afterwards
she set four o f the children in bed, neatly covered by a sheet, while leaving her last child
dead in the bathtub. Yates then proceeded to calmly call both her husband and the police
to report her actions. She told the police in detail of the events, including the oldest
child’s attempts to escape her hold as she held him under the water until he took his last
breath.’
On March 12,2002, nine months after the murders, a jury spent less than three hours
determining that Andrea Yates was not legally insane, and therefore was guilty o f first
degree murder.'^ The standard that Texas directed the Jury to use to determine Yates

' S ee generally, Abraham S. G oldstein, The Insanity D efense (N ew Haven and London; Yale
U niversity Press. 1967) 3-8.
■ See generally. Bill Hewitt. “Life or Death?” People W eekly 4 March 2002, v57, i8, 82; Anne Belli
G esalm an and Lynette C lem etson. “A Crazy System: A s Y ates' Family A ssessed Andrea's Life Sentence,
a Nation Ponders Its M ethod o f Coping With M adness." N ew sw eek 25 March 2002, 30; Tim othy Roche,
“The D evil and Andrea Y ates,” T im e 11 March 2 0 0 2 , vol. 159, 17.
’ Marianne Szegedy, “M others and Murder, " U S N ew s &Wor1d Report 18 March 2002. 23.
Gesalm an and C lem etson, 30.
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mental status, is a version o f the “Right-Wrong” T est/ The Texas test, which is a
simpler, and some might say cruder, version o f the 19^’’ Century test called the
M ’Naghten Rule,^ simply asks whether or not the defendant knew right from wrong with
respect to the criminal act in question/ Thus, according to the jury’s assessment o f
Y ates’ actions, Yates was legally sane under Texas' “Right-Wrong” test.
However, as evidenced from the substantial backlash currently being voiced in the
public arena,^ there is reason to doubt that the public thinks that this is the right test, and
therefore the right verdict. For many, there is a profound sense that Yates was criminally
insane, and thus should not be found guilty o f first degree murder.^ Perhaps part o f what
gives this strong impression, is her substantial history o f psychological illness that was
documented and sometimes treated, prior to the horrific events on June 20*''. For
instance, it was well known that Yates was plagued for many years by a variety o f very
serious psychological m a la d ie s .T h e s e included severe post-partum depression that
began with the birth o f her first child, Noah, and reccurred after the birth o f her fourth
child, Luke." When Luke was bom , Yates became “agitated and withdrawn, with
extreme anxiety and sadness,” and then after four months, Yates tried to kill herself by
taking 40-50 of her father’s antidepressants. Subsequently, Yates was diagnosed with

^ The “Right-W rong” test refers to a kind o f test which m akes reference to the moral concepts o f “right"
and “wrong." It has its m odem origins in the M 'N aghten Rule, which will be discussed in the Sec. II. B
below .
^ See sec. II, B below .
^ Texas Penal C ode, sec. 8.01 A ( 19 94, amended).
^ Gesalm an and C lem etson, 30; Jennifer S. Bard, “Unjust Rules for Insanity." The N ew York Tim es 13
March 2 0 0 2 , A 27 (N ), A 25 (L), col. I (18 col. in).
" Ibid.
H ewitt, 82.
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“major depressive disorder” and was placed on the antidepressant Z o l o f t . O t h e r
indications o f the severity o f her psychological illnesses, were that she had “scratched
several bald spots onto her scalp,” because o f tension and anxiety, and was plagued by
hallucinations that “Satan was living in her and that she and Satan both must be
punished.”'^ Moreover, in the two weeks prior to the drowning o f her children, though
suffering from depression and suicidal impulses, Yates was taken off the powerful anti
psychotic drug Haldol.'"^ Two days after being taken off Haldol, Yates was found by her
brother, Randy, to be in very bad condition. She barely spoke and seemed indifferent to
everything. According to Randy, “she carried the baby around on her hip more like a
football or a loaf o f bread ... not like she was a loving mother.” '^
The Yates case is a perfect example o f how controversial, and for some deeply
troubling, the insanity defense can be. On the assumption that Yates did indeed “know
right from wrong,” and thus was legally sane, many have argued that something m ust be
wrong with the Texas test for criminal insanity.'^’ However, this controversy is not
limited to Texas’ test for insanity, although perhaps it is particularly severe in this state.

" Ibid.
Ibid.
" Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See generally the discussion o f the M 'N aghten Rule in sec. II. B below . Specifically, see Bard. A l l
(N ), A25 (L), col. 1 ( 1 8 col in); G esalm an and C lem etson, 30.
See sec. II. B below . The M 'N aghten test for criminal insanity is highly controversial. Thus. Texas'
test, which can reasonably be construed as a narrower form o f M 'N aghten, would be particularly
controversial according to legal scholars and theoreticians.
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Rather, the history o f the insanity defense is littered with controversial c a s e s . T h e
Yates case is simply one o f the more recent, high profile cases in this longstanding
controversy.
Although a variety o f explanations for our continuing dissatisfaction with the various
versions o f the insanity defense have been offered by legal scholars and philosophers
such as the version used in the Yates case,

there are five issues that arise most often in

contemporary analyses o f the topic. These issues are:
( 1). The role that ""mental disease" should play in determining criminal insanity.
(2). The role that ""volition" should play in the insanity defense."”
(3). The role that ""rationality " should play in the insanity defense.^'
(4). W hether or not the defendant should have a legal understanding o f the
criminal act, as opposed to a moral understanding?^"
(5). W hether or not the defendant should have a noncognitive understanding o f
the criminal behavior, as well as a cognitive understanding?'^
In this paper, I will analyze two philosophers’ perspectives on criminal insanity, and
their responses to these difficult issues, in hopes of ultimately finding better alternatives
than those offered by the state o f Texas for determining criminal insanity. I will do this
by first providing a fairly brief history o f the insanity defense, attempting to explain some

Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and Criminal Culpability (N ew York; John W iley and Sons. inc.. 1995)
1-14.
Goldstein, 45-96.
Robinson, 3 02-305; G oldstein, 67-79; Fingarette, 158-172.
■' Fingarette, 173-215; M ichael M oore. Placing Blam e (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 595-609;
Lawrie Reznek, Eyil or 111: Justifying the Insanity D efen se. 173-199.
Robinson, 294-300; G oldstein, 51-53; Fingarette. 142-157.
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o f the problems that have characteristically given rise to the above five issues. This will
be followed by an elucidation and explanation o f the views o f Herbert Fingarette"^ and
Lawrie Reznek/^ and finally, by an application o f their views to the Yates case.
II. Historv O f The Criminal Insanity Defense
A. Vre-M'Na 2hten History
The history o f the criminal insanity defense can be naturally divided into two broad
phases; Vxq-M 'Naghten and V o s i - M 'N a g h t e n The Vvt-M'Naghten phase began in the
year o f 1313 with a case involving the capacities o f an infant under the age o f seven."’
At that time, the criminal law was dominated by Biblical faith, and thus developed a
religiously motivated insanity test that became known as the “Good-Evil” test.’®
According to this view, persons who lack the necessary component for punishment, i.e.,
blameworthiness, ought to be thought o f and treated like children. Just as we understand
children to have not yet developed the capacity to “do the right thing” in certain relevant
circumstances, so too is this the case with the criminally insane. The capacity for
behaving in accordance with the good will that the Bible teaches is what the Good-Evil
test is designed to measure. The following passage gives a flavor o f the test: “ ...

■’ R obinson, 2 8 6 -3 0 1 ; G oldstein, 49-50; Fingarette, 142-152.
S ee fn. 19.
See fn. 21.
M 'N aghten refers to the highly influential 1843 case involving Daniel M ’Naghten. a defendant who
pleads not guilty by reason o f insanity. This case is discussed in the next section.
M ichael Perlin. The Jurisprudence o f the Insanity D efense (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina
A cadem ic Press, 1994) 74-75.
Ibid., 75.
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sin[ning] against [their will] is restrained in children, in fools, and in the witless who do
not have the reason whereby they can choose the good from the evil.”’^
For most o f the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Centuries, England employed the
Good-Evil test or some variant/^ However, in 1724 with the case of Rex v. Arnold, this
test for criminal insanity changed som ew hat/' At the trial o f a defendant who had shot
and wounded a British Lord, the judge instructed the jury to determine the legal status o f
the act in accordance with the following proposition: "

a mad man ... must be a man

that is totally deprived o f this understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is
doing, no more titan a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object o f
punishment.”^' This test became known as the “Wild Beast” test.^^ It seems to equate
the actions o f criminally insane persons with a wild animal that lacks the right intellectual
abilities to distinguish their violent actions from moral or legal wrongdoing. In this
sense, the Wild Beast moves away from the Biblical concepts that are employed in the
Good-Evil test, and adopts a more naturalistic understanding o f criminal insanity.
The third '?xe-M'Naghten test that developed, which is the most obvious precursor to
the iamoMS M ’N aghten trial, is known as the "Right-W rong” test. Developing from the
Parker and Bellingham cases o f 1812,’^'* the jury was instructed to determine whether the
defendant “had sufficient understanding to distinguish good from evil, right from

Anthony Platt and Bernard L. Diam ond, “The O rigins o f the ‘Right and W rong’ Test o f Criminal
R esponsibility and Its Subsequent D evelopm ent in the United States: An Historical Survey," 54 Calif. L.
Rev 1996, 1227.
Slovenko, 6-8; Perlin, 75.
" R ex v. Arnold, 16 H ow St. Tr. 695 (1724).
Ibid.
Slovenko, 8-9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

wrong.”'*^ This test, in turn, was expanded in the Regina v. Oxfor(f^ trial of 1840 to
include other language which proves to be an additional influence on M ’N aghten. In
Regina v. Oxford, Lord Denman further elaborates this criminal insanity determination:
The jury must determine whether the defendant “from the effect of a diseased mind. ..was
quite unaware o f the nature, character, and consequences o f the act he was committing." ’^
B. M ’Naghten
The 1843 trial o f Daniel M ’Naghten marks the beginning of what can reasonably be
called the first modem test for criminal insanity, and is therefore considered a pivotal
event in criminal insanity jurisprudence. ’^ After some 31 years o f using a version o f the
Right-Wrong test, the English courts decided to alter the content o f the insanity defense
to include a seemingly more specific set of criteria that allowed for a more accurate and
thorough evaluation o f the accused. The important details that give rise to the new
determination o f criminal insanity come from two sources. The first is from the nature of
the case itself. The second is from the reactions o f important members of the English
society after the verdict was announced.^^^
Daniel M ’Naghten was accused o f murder after he shot a man whom he thought was
responsible for trying to kill him. The victim in this case was Edward Drummund, who
M ’Naghten mistakenly thought was the Prime Minister o f England, Robert Peel.

Platt & D iam ond, 1237 cit. in G .D C oliinson, “A Treatise on the Law Concerning Idiots, Lunatics,
and Other Persons N on C om pos M entis," W. Reed 1812, 4 77, 6.36, 656-657.
Stephen R. Lewinstein, “The Historical D evelopm ent o f Insanity as a D efense in Criminal Actions,"
Part 1, 14 J. Journal o f Forensic Science 1969, 27 5 ,2 7 9 , qtd. in G .D C oliinson, 671. See fn. 34.
Regina v. O xford, 9 Carr, and P. 525 (1 8 4 0 ).
” Ibid.
Slovenko, 9.
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M ’Naghten was under the illusion that there was a widespread plot to kill him by the
Tories, and thus perceived his action as “self defense.’”*® It was then up to the courts to
determine whether M ’Naghten acted on a delusion o f self-defense, and what criteria
should be employed in order to make this determination.
Ultimately, nine psychiatrists testified that M ’Naghten was criminally insane and
should not be held responsible for his action."*' M ’Naghten was subsequently declared
not guilty by reason o f insanity (NGRI), which had a large social impact on England as a
whole, and specifically on Queen Victoria."*^ After hearing o f the NGRI verdict, and
upon great outrage that the courts could have come to such a decision. Queen Victoria
proceeded to demand that the legislature “lay down the rule’’ in order to protect the
public."*^
In response to such commands, the House o f Lords asked the Supreme Court of
Judicature to answer a series o f questions.'*'* The answer to two of these questions
essentially became what is known as the M ’Naghten Rule. The famous words of the test
are as follows:
The jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is presumed to be sane, and
to possess a sufficient degree o f reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the
contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defense on the
ground o f insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of the committing o f
the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
Perlin, 78-84.
40

M 'N agh ten ’s Case, 10 Clark and Fin. 2 0 0 (1843).
S lovenk o, 7.

Hermann & Sor, “C onvicting or C onfining? Alternative Directions in the Insanity Law Reform:
G uilty But M entally III Versus N ew Rules for R elease o f Insanity A cquitees,” B .Y .U . L. R e \. 1983,
4 4 9 ,5 0 8 , 5 1 0 qtd. in Benson, The Letters O f Queen V ictoria. 1837-1861 1907, 587.
Ibid.
Perlin, 80.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

o f the mind, as to not know the nature and quality o f the act he was doing; or, if he
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."*^

Though M ’Naghten was considered a fairer test for insanity than previous tests, a
num ber o f criticisms were made o f the rule.'**’ These include, first, the interpretational
issues associated with defining such key words as “wrong” or “know.” For example, it
has traditionally been acknowledged, that “wrong” could be understood in a legal or
moral sense, and likewise, that “know” could refer to a mere cognitive understanding, as
opposed to emotional understanding."*’ Similarly, there are difficulties o f interpreting the
meaning o f the term “disease.” One clear ambiguity that runs through the interpretation
o f “disease” in M'Naghten concerns the distinction between the concept of disease as
understood to obtain at the time o f the criminal act, versus disease as understood as
having a certain amount o f duration in the defendant’s life."*** In other words, are we to
think o f disease as something that is in some sense chronic, or rather as something that
can be suddenl Similarly, questions arose as to the meaning o f the terms “nature and
quality,”"*'* as in “know the nature and quality o f the act.” Does “nature and quality,”
refer to the physical nature o f the act, or some other aspect o f the act? For instance, did
the defendant know that when he stabbed the victim with a knife, that the victim might
lose blood and eventually die? Or if the defendant knew that, did he understand that the
victim didn’t really want to die? There is a significant difference between knowing the

M 'N agh ten ’s Case, 10 Clark and Fin. 2 0 0 (1843).
Slovenko, 21-22; G oldstein, 4 5 -5 6 .
G oldstein, 4 9 -5 3 .
Ibid., 4 7 -4 9 .
Ibid., 50-51.
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nature and quality o f an act from the perspective o f physical causation, versus knowing
the nature and quality o f an act from a more first or third person moral point o f view /°
A second set o f difficulties are more logical in n a tu re /' These difficulties concern the
possibility that certain aspects of the test were conceptually mistaken, because they fail to
embody the necessary and sufficient conditions for criminal insanity. It has been argued,
for example, that whether or not such key phrases such as “wrong,” “know,” and
“disease” are interpreted in a legal/moral, cognitive/noncognitive, or sudden/chronic
sense, none o f these concepts may be necessary or sufficient for determining criminal
insanity.*’' Thus, in a similar manner that having blond hair is neither necessary nor
sufficient for being a bachelor, so too “knowing that the act was wrong” may be
irrelevant for determining criminal insanity. This is because the meaning o f “criminal
insanity” as it is used for the purposes o f the criminal law, may have no necessary
connection to the meanings that are given by the terms “wrong,” “know,” and/or
“ disease.” Thus, although these concepts may often be associated with criminal insanity,
this association may prove to be coincidental, or at any rate, inadequate for determining
criminal insanity. Examples o f this sort o f argument will be given later, in discussion of
the analyses o f Fingarette and Reznek.
C. Irresistible Impulse
In direct response to these interpretational and logical difficulties, there was a general
feeling amongst those both in and outside the criminal law that M ’N aghten was too

Ibid.
Fingarette, 1 7 3 -1 7 5 ,1 4 9 , 156; M oore, 600-601 ; R ezn ek ,]52-161.
Fingarette, pg. 149,156.
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restrictive and did not allow for a proper evaluation o f the accused/'^ As a result, the
courts began to consider additional concepts that might be relevant and useful in the
determination o f criminal insanity/^
The first o f these concepts, “Irresistible Impulse," marks the point in which the fourth
o f the principal issues o f this paper, “volition," becomes historically relevant. The
“Irresistible Impulse Rule" was first successfully used in the 1886 case o f Parsons \\
State,^^ and was subsequently made the federal rule in the United States in Davis.^^ In
Parsons, the jury was instructed to determine whether or not the defendant exhibited a
radical loss o f control such that his free agency is destroyed;
Did he know right from wrong, as applied to the particular act in question? ... If he
did have knowledge, he may nevertheless not be legally responsible if the
following conditions occur: ( 1) If, by reason o f the duress o f such mental disease,
he had so far lost the pow er to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid
doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed; (2) and
if, at the same time, the alleged crime was so connected with such mental disease,
in the relation o f cause and effect, as to have been the product of it solely.

While this particular framing o f the Irresistible Impulse Rule was considered
somewhat narrow,^'^ later versions, particularly in the Model Penal Code, allowed for a
broader interpretation than the one given in Parsons.^^^ In the Model Penal Code, it was

Fingarette, pg. 149, 156; Reznek, pgs. 2 0 0 -2 0 4 , 222; See, for instance, sec. Ill, A, 28-38, B, 56-59
below .
Slovenko, 20; G oldstein, 4 6 -4 7 .
Slovenko, 22-31 ; G oldstein, 67.
Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 57 7 ,2 So. 854 (1886).
D avis

V.

United States, 165 W .S. (1 8 9 7 ).

Parsons v. State, 81 A la. 577, 2 So. 854 (1886).
Robinson, 302.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12

required that the agent “(lack) substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality o f his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements o f law,” as opposed to “losing the
power to choose between right and wrong.”'’' This particular way o f stating the
Irresistible Impulse Rule was considered less restrictive than was the one in Parsons due
to the open language o f “substantial capacity.

In this sense, the language o f

“substantial capacity” explicitly allowed for partial impairment o f a defendant’s
volitional ability as opposed to total impairment, whereas with Parsons, the language o f
“losing the power to choose between right and wrong,” did not imply that the defendant’s
volitional impairment could be partial.^^
Like M 'Naghten, the Irresistible Impulse Rule was subject to interpretational and
logical problems that allowed for inconsistent applications o f the test. Perhaps the most
prominent example o f a difficulty in interpretation concerns an ambiguity that was made
prominent in the case o f Snider v. Smith.^'* This difficulty is evident in the distinction
between a sudden and gradual loss o f control.'’'’ This was a major complaint about the
Irresistible Impulse Rule, and reveals why it was misleading to use the label of
“Irresistible Impulse” to designate the phenomenon in question.'’'’ Irresistible Impulse
was thought to imply a sudden loss o f control, a “fit o f rage,” or something similar.
However, in light of what was thought to be an overly restrictive understanding of

“ Ibid.
ALL M odel Penal Code. Proposed O fficial Draft. Sec. 4.01.
Robinson. 302.
Ibid.
^ Snider v. Smith. 187 F. Supp. 2 9 9 . 302 (E D. Va. 1960).
Robinson. 3 0 2 -3 0 3 .
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volition by legal scholars, some urged a version o f the Irresistible Impulse Rule that
allowed for a gradual loss o f control.^^ One scholar even suggested that it would be more
appropriate to put the Irresistible Impulse Rule under the heading o f “Control Tests,” due
to the fact that the loss o f control concept seems more neutral than does “Irresistible
Impulse” with respect to the sudden/gradual distinction.^®
A second problem interpreting this rule, concerned the distinction between impaired
resistance and overpowering urge.^‘^ Although losing control is often thought of in the
sense o f overpowering urges, frequently defendants simply did not have the ability to
resist what would be, under normal circumstances, quite easy for persons to resist. Thus,
how “loss o f control” is interpreted in the sense o f impaired resistance and/or an
overpowering urge, can have a great effect on the determination of insanity. Particularly
this is the case when looking at which kind o f medical condition might be responsible for
the loss o f control. As Paul Robinson has argued; “An obsessive compulsive disorder,
resulting in uncontrollable ‘recurrent, persistent ideas, thoughts, images, or impulses,' is
an example o f a disorder that produces an urge. But few others are so clearly capable o f
producing ‘urges’.”^®
Another kind of criticism, concerns the empirical difficulty o f determining when
someone loses control.^' This is evident when a court tries to determine what would

“ Ibid.
G oldstein. 70-78; R obinson. 3 02-303.
G oldstein, 70-78.
^ R obinson. 302-303; S lovenk o. 25.
™ R obinson, 303.
S loven ko, 25; G oldstein. 77; R eznek, 161.
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distinguish the woman who lost control and stabbed her husband, from the woman who
stabbed her husband out o f anger? The sorts o f observations that are required in making
this distinction are difficult to specify, and it is a legitimate criticism of a conception of
the insanity defense, that, if it can’t give a clear and specific empirical account o f one o f
its main concepts, then the conception will be useless to a ju ry /"
D. Durham
The third historically significant development o f modem day, criminal insanity
jurisprudence which can be seen as an attempt to provide a better alternative to
M ’Naghten, stems from the famous 1954 case o f Durham v. United S ta te s ^

In this

case, Monte Durham, a person with a substantial history o f psychological illness and
criminal activity, came before U.S. Court o f Appeals for the District o f Columbia, after
having been found guilty o f housebreaking in a District Court. In the appeal, it was urged
by the Durham defense that the M 'Naghten and Irresistible Impulse Rules were
inadequate for determining criminal responsibility. Judge David Bazelon, writing for the
District o f Columbia Court o f Appeals, agreed. As a result, the test for criminal insanity
in the D.C. Circuit was altered so that it read, “a person is criminally insane if they suffer
from mental disease or delect.”^^ W ith this new test for criminal insanity, a jury, on
remand to the District Court, found Monte Durham NGBI.
The Durham Rule was certainly not without precursors, the most obvious of which
was the disease component oiM 'N aghten, which said that the “the party must be laboring

S ee, for instance, R eznek, 75-90.
Durham v. U S, 9 4 U S App D C 2 2 8 , 21 4 F2d 862, 45 ALR 2d 1430 (1954).
74

Ibid.
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under a defect o f reason from disease o f the mind.”^^ A second precursor to Durham
comes from the 1953 report o f British Royal Commission on Capitol Punishment.^*^ The
report, which considered the status o f both M ’N aghten and the Irresistible Impulse Rule
and was heavily influenced by a large number o f medical and legal scholars, asserts that
the scholars were “in virtual agreem ent... that the mind functions as an integrated whole
and that it is impossible to isolate the separate functions o f cognition and control.
Similarly, Bazelon said, in Durham, the following about validity o f M ’N aghten and the
Irresistible Impulse Rule:
We find that as an exclusive criterion the right-wrong test is inadequate in that (a)
it does not take sufficient account o f psychic realities and scientific knowledge, and
(b) it is based upon one symptom and so cannot validly be applied in all
circumstances. We find that the “irresistible impulse” test is also inadequate in that
it gives no recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and reflection
and so relegates acts caused by such illness to the application o f the inadequate
right-wrong test. We conclude that a broader test should be adopted.

An additional problem with D u r h a m concerned its failure to give empirical content
to the key theoretical tools employed, viz., “mental disease" and “defect." The only clear
meaning that was given to these terms concerned the difference between disease and
defect, where it was said that diseases have the capability o f getting better, whereas

75

M ’N aghten’s Case, îO Clark and Fin. 200 (1843).
G oldstein, 80.82.
Q uoted in G oldstein, 80. as interpreted from Report o f Royal Com m ission on Capitol Punishment.
Durham v. U S , 94 U S App DC 2 2 8 . 214 F2d 862, 45 ALR 2d 1430 (1954).

^’ R ecall that these problem s stem m ing from M 'N aghten concerned, on the one hand, an interpretation
o f mental disease that required that it be a chronic condition in the actor's life, versus an interpretation
w hich allow ed for mental disease to obtain su d den ly in his or her life. On the other hand, mental disease
w as criticized on the logical basis that it sim ply is not a part o f the legal meaning o f criminal insanit)'.
Thus, whether an actor d oes or d oes not have a mental disease may be irrelevant to the determination o f
criminal insanity.
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defects are permanent.^® This, however, was considered far from sufficient empirical
content to inform juries.®'
The most significant attempt to try to remedy these problems came in MacDonald v.
United States,

where the court focused on “impairment o f mental or emotional

processes and behavioral controls,” instead o f those processes being the product o f a
mental disease and defect.®^ By almost all accounts, however, the MacDonald attempt
was unsuccessful due, either to the vagueness o f the terms o f “mental impairment” and
“control,”®"'or to the practical difficulties associated with implementing the MacDonald
conception in the courtroom.®^
There are other important criticisms o f the Durham notion o f mental disease that are
particularly relevant to the role it should occupy in contemporary insanity jurisprudence.
The first concerns the general claim that mental disease is a social concept and not a
medical one, which has the result that testifying psychologists use a different language
and different concepts than required by the law.®^ In other words, when psychologists are
asked to testify on behalf o f the defendant as to whether or not he or she has a mental
disease, the psychologist may be using a notion o f mental disease that derives from the
discipline o f psychology, and not from the law.

David B azelon, Q uestioning Authority (N ew York: Alfred A. K noff Inc., 1966) 46-48.
Fingarette. 128.
S2

M cD onald v. U nited States, 3 12 F2d 847 ( 1962).
B azelon. 50, 63.

S4

Fingarette, 34.

B azelon, 49. Judge Bazelon argued that the tw o central difficulties with Durham concern, first, the
fact that “p sychologists did not live up to their prom ise to share all the information they knew." and second,
that the participants in the court incorrectly tended to view the terms “mental disease" and "defect" in a
technical scientific sense.
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Durham was also criticized for making psychologists ethical experts.^^ To the extent
that the law under Durham requires psychologists to make judgments about moral
responsibility based on the simple formula o f Durham, it was argued that the law was
choosing a class o f persons to make a decision concerning something in which they have
no special e x p e r t i s e . T h i s is because psychologists are no better than anyone else at
making judgments about moral responsibility, or so the criticism runs.®‘^ In this sense, the
court’s decision to make psychologists the ethical experts would be arbitrary.
Finally, some argued that mental disease is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
negation o f moral responsibility.*^® Examples that seem to provide some evidence o f this,
are depression and anxiety. In depression and anxiety, it is often the case that individuals
do not commit crimes, and are not in any way compelled to do anything of the kind. This
suggests that if and when these conditions do yield an excuse, there must be something
about these conditions in each case that serves this function, not the mere presence o f the
conditions themselves.*^’
E. American Law Institute
The case o f Brawner v. United States^' marked the end of Durham and the point at
which the American Law Institute (ALI) test became dominant in American Law.*”’ The

B azelon, 49; Fingarette. 31 -3 4 , 173-174.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Reznek, 2 00-204; M oore, 6 0 0 -6 0 1 .
R obinson, 2 8 9 -2 9 0 .
Brawner v. U.S. 471 F. 2d 969 (D .C . Cir. 1972).
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ALI test for criminal insanity, which is the most prominent test used today, says the
following:
( 1). A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result o f disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality o f his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements o f law.
(2). As used in this Article, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct.^"^

The most prominent feature o f the ALI test was its inclusiveness, meaning that it, in
some sense, adopted many o f the ideas o f the previous M 'Naghten and Post-A/ 'Naghten
tests. Thus, it is easy to see why ALI is commonly interpreted as a fusion of M ’N aghten
and the Irresistible Impulse Rule."^' However, there are two important qualifications to
this fusion. Whereas the Irresistible Impulse Rule refers to “lacking the power to choose
between the right and wrong,” ALI changes the wording to include “lacking a substantial
capacity ...

Thus, contrary to the Irresistible Impulse Test, ALI is interpreted as

acknowledging that a lack o f control can be chronic in the defendant’s life, as well as that
the substantial capacity can be partial, opposed to a total.
The second difference is a change from “know” to “appreciate.” In the M 'Naghten
test, the requirement was that the defendant not “know the nature and quality of the act or

B azelon, 50.
94

ALI, M o d e l Pena! Code, Proposed official Draft, Sec. 4.01 (1962).

G oldstein, 87. T his fusion is one w hich em ploys both a mental disease concept, and a functional test
for “w rongness” (or crim inality), both o f which have their origins in M'Naghien. Similarly, ALI em ploys
the “capacity” language, w hich is a concept used to determine the defendant's ability to control his or her
actions with respect to the criminal act in question.
96

S lovenko. 24,
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that it was wrong.”'^^ The ALI test, however, required something other than that the
defendant have a merely cognitive awareness o f the criminality of his action. Here, the
idea o f emotional appreciation, as opposed to merely prepositional understanding, was
relevant, which can be seen as an attempt to capture our intuitive understanding of the
paradigm cases o f criminal insanity.'^* In other words, in order to subsume those cases in
which it is obvious that a defendant is criminally insane under a criminal insanity test, the
courts needed to employ a noncognitive concept, such as “appreciate.”
Given the narrowness and/or ambiguity o f the M 'Naghten, Irresistible Impulse, and
Durham tests, it is easy to appreciate that the move toward the ALI Test was viewed as a
positive step. This is due to the fact that the ALI test either contains concepts that one o f
previous tests may omit (a volitional prong), or that it embodies a better understanding of
the mental states that are required for a defendant to be culpable, viz., an appreciation of
the criminality o f the act.

However, while these changes certainly seem to be

improvements upon past tests, there were still problems that critics have raised.
In addition to all o f the aforementioned problems that beset hoih M ’Naghten and
Durham which concern the interpretation o f the term “mental disease,” ALI was also
subject to the problem that the plirase “substantial incapacity” is ambiguous, because it
fails to address the causal connection that the incapacity has with the exculpating
c o n d i t i o n . I n other words, it was possible that the specific incapacity o f the defendants
may or may not be linked to the criminal act. ALI needs the further premise that the
substantial incapacity is causally responsible for the criminal behavior. Or as one legal

G oldstein, 87.
Fingarette, 146-148; G oldstein, 49-50.
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scholar points out, “[the capacity to appreciate the criminality] ... only requires that the
mental disease cause a particular mental condition, not that it cause a particular excusing
condition in relation to the conduct constituting the offense.” '
Another problem with ALI concerns the use o f the term “criminality.” Here, it
appears that lacking a substantial capacity to appreciate the c r im in a ls o f one’s actions
was overly restrictive. In a similar way that wrongfulness (understood as legally wrong)
was criticized for being too restrictive in the M 'Naghten Rule, the same criticism held for
A LI.'”' In this narrow sense, it is only required that the defendant appreciate the
criminality o f his or her conduct, and not necessarily the morality’ o f the conduct, which
is a condition that even in the “paradigm cases” the defendant will usually satisfy.'”" For
instance, regarding M ’Naghten, it is quite clear that he knew that his actions were wrong
in the sense that his attempting to kill the Prime Minister o f England was against the law.
However, he clearly did not believe that this was morally wrong. Rather, M ’Naghten
believed was that his action was that o f self-defense.
Finally, there was the distinct interpretational difficulty that was associated with the
meaning o f the term “appreciate.” “Appreciate” can be interpreted in two ways, in terms
o f likelihood and in terms o f degree.

W ith regard to the former, it could be the case

that the defendant “isn’t sure” that the actions were wrong, and that there was only a risk
that a harm may result. Thus, on this way o f framing the rule, to appreciate the
wrongfulness o f one’s actions was to acknowledge that it could be wrong. For the latter.

R obinson, 299.
Ibid.
Ibid.. 2 9 5 -2 9 6 .
Ibid.
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it could be the case that while the action was wrong, the agent did not appreciate the
gravity o f his actions, or that while he appreciated that the action was wrong, he didn’t
know it “as wrong.” '^
The next section will explain the perspectives of two scholars, Herbert Fingarette and
Lawrie Reznek, concerning the controversial role that the “legal/moral,“
“cognitive/noncognitive,” “mental disease,” and “volitional” elements should play in
criminal insanity jurisprudence, as well as the issue o f whether or not the concept of
“rationality” should be included in insanity tests. This discussion will be carried out from
the specific five-part framework proposed in this p a p e r . I n other words, the works of
these two philosophers will be explained in terms o f the unique responses that they have
to the various interpretational, empirical, and logical issues that have been associated
with the use o f these concepts in criminal insanity jurisprudence.
III.

Two Approaches to the Central Issues o f Criminal Insanity

A. Herbert Fingarette
1.

Preliminary summary. Herbert Fingarette proposes revisions to all o f the past

and current insanity tests. Fingarette holds that M 'Naghten, Irresistible Impulse,
D urham , and ALI, should be amended in some form or another. There are a number of

things that Fingarette finds objectionable in current criminal insanity doctrine!s) which
are similar to the difficulties discussed in Sections 1 and 11 above. Summarized briefly,
Fingarette holds, first, that the language o f “understands” and “knows” that is contained

10 ?

’ Ibid.. 297.
Ibid.

105

S ee see. I and II, 1-25 above.
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in the M'Naghten Rule, is p ro b lem atic/’^ This is partly because M'Naghten mistakenly
leaves open the possibility for an exclusively cognitive interpretation o f the defendant’s
mental states, and partly because these concepts are misplaced in the first p l a c e / ’ In this
latter sense, Fingarette argues that the concepts o f “understands” and “knows" are neither
necessary nor sufficient for the meaning o f criminal insanity as it is used in a court of
l a w /^ Instead, his account is both cognitivist and noncognitivist in nature and employs a
different approach and different set o f concepts than M ’N aghten in order to correct what
he believes is its overly narrow r u le /^
A second aspect o f the traditional insanity tests that Fingarette finds objectionable and
to which he gives an alternative, concerns the inclusion o f a mental disease prong
(contained in the tests o f M 'Naghten, ALI, and Durham)}^^ Fingarette believes that the
mental disease prong (especially in Durham) needs revision, because a test which
employs this concept runs the risk o f incorrectly putting the psychologist in the role of
ethical e x p ert."' Fie also argues that Û\e M'Naghten and Durham tests are problematic
on account o f the difficult nature o f the concept o f mental disease, understood in a

'“’ Fingarette. 148-149.
Ibid.. 146-148.
Ibid., 1 7 7 ,2 1 1 .
Herbert Fingarette and Ann Fingarette H asse, Mental D isabilities and Criminal Rcsponsibiljty
(B erkeley; University o f California Press. 1979) 237; Fingarette, 146-150. 27.
Fingarette.. 127-128. 173-174.
Ibid.. 3 1 ,4 5 -5 2 . 173-174. 247.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23

m edical sense.

Fingarette addresses these issues by arguing that, for the purposes o f

the insanity defense, m ental disease is a social, not a m edical, concept."^
T hird, Fingarette’s account also focuses on certain problem atic conceptual or logical
features o f M 'N a g h ten , A LI, Irresistible Im pulse, and D urham . H e argues that a
volitional prong should not be included in insanity tests due, prim arily, to the fact that a
volitional p ro ng “does not bring out w hat is central in our concept o f insanity.*’’
Instead, he believes that the notion o f “irrationality” successfully captures the necessary
and sufficient conditions o f crim inal insanity. Fingarette sim ilarly argues that this is the
case w ith M ’N aghten and A L I’s em ploym ent o f the m oral concept o f “w rongness.” ’
“W ro n g n ess” is considered by Fingarette to be irrelevant to the determ ination o f crim inal
insanity in the courtroom . Instead, according to Fingarette, “w rongness,” “volition,”
“m ental d isease,” in the past and present insanity tests should be replaced by Fingarette’s
distinctive notion o f “irrationality” insofar as it relates to the crim inality o f the
d efe n d an t’s c o n d u ct.” ^
2.

D etailed D iscussion. Fingarette argues for a general definition o f crim inal insanity

th at has three conceptual elem ents: “(a) irrational conduct, (b) from grave defect in the
p e rs o n ’s capacity for rational conduct, and (c) w hich is at least for the tim e an inherent
p art o f the p e rso n ’s m ental m akeup.” ’”^ T he specific version o f crim inal insanity that he

Ibid ., 2 2 - 2 5 . 37 . S e e g e n e r a lly , 1 9 -5 2 .
Ib id ., 3 7 -5 2 .
1 14

Ib id ., 1 2 3 -1 2 5 , 152, 1 5 6 -1 5 9 .

” ■ Ibid .. 71 .
"'^‘ Ib id .. 1 5 4 -1 5 6 .
Ib id ., 2 1 1 .
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argues fo r is: “The in d iv id u al’s m ental m akeup at the tim e o f the offending act was such
that, w ith respect to the crim inality o f his conduct, he substantially lacked capacity to act
ratio n ally (to respond relevantly to relevance so far as crim inality is concerned).” '
Fingarette explains and illustrates the central notion o f “responding relevantly to
relev an ce” by a series o f thought experim ents. '

Jones, w ho is w alking in a park one

day, decides to throw a rock into som e bushes. Jones does this in a m anner that is
unaw are, i.e., he is n ’t really thinking about throw ing the rock. Fingarette asks us w hat
our intuitions tell us about the rationality o f Jones? He tells us that there is a sense that
Jones is acting non-rationally, but not irrationality.‘‘ ‘ Fingarette then poses the question:
W hat is it that w e are denying b y saying that Jo n es’ conduct is not irrational?
U ltim ately, w e are denying that “there is som ething crazy, bizarre, odd, or insane” about
Jones. The issue, then, for Fingarette becom es trying to find the correct ascription o f
irrationality w hich is “distinctive in insanity.”
In order to find this ascription, Fingarette then asks us to consider a variation on this
th o u g h t experim ent.'-'* E verything is the sam e as the first exam ple, except that w hen
Jo n es is about to throw the rock into the bushes, he sees a person. Sm ith, m oving about.
T hen, because he notices Sm ith in the bushes, Jones chooses to throw the rock in another
direction. W hat has happened? B asically, Jones has altered his actions based on a
I IX

F in garette, 2 0 3 .
Ib id ., 2 1 1 .
Ib id .. 1 8 5 -1 9 1 .

' =' Ibid., 185.
Ibid., 186.
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relevant piece o f data that entered the picture, viz.. Sm ith’s presence. And moreover, this
relevant piece o f data confers on Jones a basic moral responsibility, something to the
effect of, “don’t harm someone unnecessarily.” In this case, Jones behaves rationally,
because he responds in the right way to “essential relevance.” ' T h i s begins to capture
the sense o f rationality that is pertinent to criminal responsibility and criminal insanity,
according to Fingarette.
Fingarette next considers another variation:'"^ Jones, in the situation with Smith in the
bushes, decides to throw the rock anyway, quite aware o f the consequences, but not
caring. Perhaps Jones is in a bad mood. In this case, Fingarette tells us that it would be
natural to describe Jones’ behavior as rational and malicious.'*^
Finally, Fingarette asks us to conceive o f another variation in order to help us
understand the notion o f irrationality that is relevant to criminal insanity.'"^ Suppose that
Jones believes “that he is being pursued and persecuted, and is the object of systematic
attempts at assassination. He sees Smith appear in the bushes. He instantly and violently
throws the rock at him.” What do we conclude about Jones with respect to the rationality
o f his actions? First, we believe that the action is clearly irrational in the sense that he
fails to respond in the right way to a something that, according to our norms, he should
respond to. Second, as Fingarette argues, “the fanatic character of his belief [that he is
being pursued and persecuted, and is the object o f systematic attempts at assassination] in
the face o f everything, leads us to conclude that, in this connection, he is incapable o f

Ibid.
Ibid., 1K6-187.
'-" ib id .. 187.
Ibid.
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rationality, not merely a dedicated or stubborn man who is in error." This describes a
situation in which the person cannot respond relevantly to essential relevance,'"^ or, as
Fingarette states it elsewhere, this is a situation in which the action simply is not
intelligible in terms o f the relevant norms o f our society.'^®
Fingarette’s account focuses on what Lawrie Reznek calls "‘‘substantive rationality."''^^
According to Reznek, substantive rationality is to be distinguished from formal
rationality, in that substantive rationality is understood relative to some value or belief
that the agent ought to have, whereas formal rationality is understood relative to some
value or belief that he actually has.’’’* Thus, “someone is substantively rational if he not
only chooses the best means to his ends, but also if his ends or desires themselves are
rational."'” The reason that Fingarette’s analysis is substantive, according to Reznek, is
that, in his hypothetical cases, it is the normative judgment about what Jones ought to
believe or value regarding Sm ith’s presence in the bushes, that leads to the judgment that
Jones’ behavior was rational or irrational. The following passage from Fingarette
expresses what Reznek is talking about:
Let it be reemphasized at once: to be able to act rationally with respect to the
criminality of one’s conduct is not the same as to obey the law or even to respect it.
It is simply to be able to rationally take into account the implications o f the act
relevant to criminality ... If all rational persons always obeyed the law, it would be
pointless to have courts and punishments. On the other hand if no person had the
capacity for rationality, it would be pointless to appeal to law. The criminal may

Ibid., 190.
Ibid.. 190-191.
Ibid., 192.
Reznek, 177.
Ibid.
’

Ibid.
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be stupid, immoral, greedy, ruthless, imprudent, or impulsive ... But none of this
implies that he has lost his reason in these matters, indeed quite the contrary. For if
we do judge that he has lost his reason, we no longer think it appropriate to
characterize him as being imprudent, unwise, or immoral. The opposites of
“rational” in this context are “irrational,” “senseless,” unintelligible.'^'*

In this passage, we can see the sorts o f normative judgments that Fingarette employs in
order to determine what should constitute “responding relevantly to essential relevance.”
These normative judgments are embodied in the adjectives “irrational,” “senseless,” or
“unintelligible,” and entail the sorts o f judgements that are needed, according to Reznek,
to determine how actors ought to respond to their circumstances, if they are to be
considered “sane.” ' "*^ In the case o f Jones, what justifies the judgment that Jones was
insane, in Fingarette’s view, is that Jones could not respond to his ideas about being
persecuted in ways that would have prevented him from throwing the rock at Smith.
How do we knoM\ according to Fingarette, that Jones could not respond to his ideas about
being persecuted in ways that would have prevented him from throwing the rock at
Smith? Because Jones’ behavior appears “crazy,” “bizarre,” “odd,” or “insane."’*^’
Fingarette’s proposed conception o f criminal insanity is different from any o f the
traditional tests described in Section II. Fingarette believes, for example, that instead o f
“knowing,” “appreciating,” or “understanding the nature and quality o f the act or that it
was wrong,” the central concept that should be used is that of “responding relevantly to
essential relevance.” Thus, for example, whereas M'Naghten will lead a jury to
determine insanity on the basis o f the defendant’s knowledge (or lack thereof) of the

Ibid., 211.
Fingarette., 177, 185, 211; Fingarette and Hasse, 237.
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nature and quality o f the act or that it was wrong, Fingarette’s test will lead a jury to
focus on the defendant’s capacity to respond in ways that are considered appropriate (i.e.,
respond relevantly) to those aspects in the defendant’s life that criminally insane persons
should respond to (i.e., essential relevance).'^’ Perhaps these relevant responses to those
aspects o f the defendant’s life that criminally insane persons should respond to, involve
such things, as the defendant’s emotional reactions to his mother, his beliefs about his
church, or attitude towards society in general. In a paranoid schizophrenic's case like
that o f Jones, it appears that Fingarette’s determination, specifically, is that Jones lacked
a substantial capacity to respond with the proper beliefs and emotional outlook to his fear
that he was being persecuted.'^*
Ultimately, then, the verdicts that derive from Fingarette’s test can be quite different
than the verdicts that derive from the traditional tests described in Section 11. Whereas
with M 'Naghten, a defendant is sane, if the defendant knows the nature and quality o f the
act or that it was wrong, under Fingarette’s test, the defendant may still be insane. This is
because, although a defendant may know, for instance, that killing the victim would end
his or her life and would likewise be against the law, the defendant may not be able to
respond in the appropriate way to certain other aspects o f his or her life that a jury
considers relevant to the criminality o f the defendant’s conduct. Thus, as was said above,
Jones may not have been able to respond with the proper beliefs and emotions to his fear
that he was being persecuted, even though he may know that his act would hurt Smith,

Fingarette, 185. For a more in depth discussion o f R eznek's perspective o f Fingarette’s view , and for
an explanation as to precisely why Fingarette’s insanity tests requires these normative judgem ents
concerning what is “bizarre” or unintelligible, see sec. ill, B, ii, 42-53 below .
S ee the discussion below , sec. Ill, B, ii, 44-47; Fingarette, 185-191.
Fingarette, 185-191.
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and would be illegal. Fingarette’s test axid M 'Naghten, then, are, according to Fingarette.
logically independent o f one another.
As was alluded to, Fingarette reads “the ability to respond relevantly to essential
relevance” both cognitively and noncogntively.'"^® In this sense, the defendant must have
both a propositional understanding o f those aspects in his or her life that are relevant to
criminality, as well as an understanding that comes from the emotions, desires, moods,
etc. Consider, for example, what Fingarette says o f individuals with “psychopathic
personalities:”
Individuals with psychopathic personalities may manifest a bizarre insensitivity or
a purposefully cultivated but now deep-rooted callousness that enables them to
commit crimes o f peculiarly inhuman or cruel kinds. Could it be said, then, that on
the whole each lacks capacity for rational conduct in regard to the criminal
significance o f the act because o f a gross incapacity for emotional responsiveness?
... If the facts do show chronic generalized failure to develop human relationshipsi.e., a generalized incapacity to respond with feelings to the sufferings, agonies or
death o f human beings— then we do indeed have grounds to view the individual as
criminally irrational.
Thus, we can see that the approach that Fingarette proposes to explain the way in which
his test should be understood, will include noncognitive capacities. These capacities may
involve the ability to feel the “suffering or agonies o f human beings,” or the extent to
which a person may be ""calloused.'" Accordingly, these noncognitive capacities may be
deeply relevant, in fact essential, for Fingarette, for properly evaluating the mental status
o f the psychopathic defendant.
Finally, Fingarette’s account is distinctive in at least the following two additional
senses. First, it makes no mention o f volition, as do the Irresistible Impulse Test and

Ibid., 138. 149-150. 176-177.
140

Fingarette and H asse, 237; Fingarette, 27. 146-150.
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ALI, and indeed Fingarette does not believe that a volitional prong has any use in the
c o u r t r o o m .T h i s is because, as we shall see,’“^^ a volitional prong does not cohere with
Fingarette’s overall methodology for determining insanity, a methodology which relies
heavily on common sense intuition and everyday l a n g u a g e .S e c o n d , the particular
feature(s) o f the defendant’s behavior that is under consideration relates to the criminalityo f his or her actions, not the m o r a lity ,w h ic h likewise, is a feature that Fingarette
argues is required by common sense moral intuition and everyday language. In this
sense, as well as with the noncognitivist reading o f the rule,*^^ Fingarette’s analysis
employs an element that is contained in ALI. In ALI, the use o f criminality is explicit,
while the language o f “substantially appreciates” is thought to connote noncognitive
concepts.

147

W ith the exception o f the “mental disease” prong o f the insanity tests, which will be
discussed in the last part o f this section, these are the basic features o f Fingarette’s
position. But, while it should be clear what Fingarette’s approach is, it has yet to be
determined why. Why does Fingarette believe that criminal insanity means something

Fingarette and Hasse, 2 3 7 .
Fingarette. 69-84, 1 58-159, 166-168.
S ee 3 5 -3 7 below .
'^ F in g a rette, 138, 1 40-141, 149-150, 155-156, 165-166, 170, 174-179.
Ibid., 211.
S ee sec. Ill, A, ii, 3 1 -3 5 below .
O bviously, Fingarette’s test for criminal insanity is different than ALL I am sim ply making the point
that there are tw o senses in w hich Fingarette’s account is similar. These are, that both tests make use o f the
idea that it is the defendant’s understanding o f the crim inality o f his or her actions that is relevant, and
sim ilarly, that this understanding is construed in both a cognitive and noncognitive sense.
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Other than v^hdiX M 'Naghten or ALI says, and why does Fingarette conclude that criminal
irrationality understood as he proposes is the best characterization o f criminal insanity?
Fingarette answers these two difficult questions with at least two types o f arguments.
The first is an argument from common sense intuition that often makes use o f the
“paradigm cases o f criminal insanity.” '"*^ The second type o f argument, is a variation on
an argument from eveiyday l a n g u a g e Fingarette attempts to show in this second
argument, that the everyday language contained in the current insanity tests, e.g. “loss o f
control” and “knowing that an the act was wrong,” are really idioms that express the kind
o f criminal irrationality to which Fingarette is r e f e r r in g .F in g a r e tte says, in effect, that
the meaning o f the key terms contained in the tests o f M ’Naghten, ALI, and the
Irresistible Impulse, is “nothing but” the meaning embodied in the phrase “responding
relevantly to essential relevance,” or one of its cognates.'^'
Fingarette argues that the case involving “Fish,” one o f the most prolific serial
murderers that the world has ever known, is a paradigm case o f insanity. Moreover, he
argues that the traditional tests for criminal insanity do not insure that the correct verdict
o f NGBI is rendered:
Fish, the complacently habitual child killer and child eater, was found sane under a
traditional insanity test, but he was in fact the paradigm of insanity. His emotional
reactions and desires were in some respects so distorted that he had not the capacity
S ee, for exam ple. 174-175 where Fingarette says that an analysis o f insanity “should coincide with
our intuitive understanding o f the term." and that “the paradigm cases o f criminal insanity are discriminated
readily" is a necessary feature o f Fingarette’s “m odel.” Prominent exam ples o f these so-called paradigm
ca ses can be found on 138, 1 40-141, 149-150, 155-156, 175-179.
S ee, for exam ple, 174 where Fingarette says that a mark o f his intuitive account o f criminal insanity
is that it will reflect “that com m on language characterizing insanity should be incorporated into or be
clearly congruent with the account proposed." Exam ples o f this kind o f argument can be found on 165166, 170, 175-179.
'-"Ibid., 175-179.
Ibid.
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to act rationally insofar as these came into play. However, his intellectual and
perceptual capacities were not ever substantially impaired, nor was he, apparently,
dominated by depressed or manic moods. When he ate children or stuck sharp
objects into his body, he knew what he was doing was contrary to law and public
morality ...U nder M 'Naghten, Davis, or the Model Penal Code formula. Fish was
sane ...Y et we do not strain language at all, indeed it is exactly apt, to say that his
conduct was grossly irrational. And it is this notion that is the ground o f our
intuitive, but very clear, perception that he is insane.’' '

Here, Fingarette argues that an observation o f the distorted and/or bizarre nature o f Fish’s
actions, his sticking sharp objects in his body and his cannibalism o f children, reveals that
Fish is criminally irrational. Moreover, this criminal irrationality is not captured by
traditional tests. Essentially, Fingarette argues that one can reasonably assert that Fish
“knew that his actions were wrong,” that he “had the capacity to appreciate the
criminality o f his actions,” and similarly, that he may not have had a “mental disease”
from a medical standpoint. However, according to Fingarette, Fish should be found
NGBI because he was acting in a “grossly irrational” manner.
Another argument where our intuitions are alleged to contradict a so-called paradigm
case o f insanity comes from the famous case o f Hadfield v. United States.

Hadfield

was a soldier who acted under the delusion that he was “destined to save mankind if he
became a martyr” when he attempted to kill King George III. In this case, Hadfield knew
that what he did was specifically and explicitly contrary to the law. Thus, Hadfield did
know that the action was wrong in a legal sense, and thus he was able to “appreciate the
criminality o f his conduct.” However, Hadfield was found not guilty, because he

Ibid.. 177.
H adfieid’s C ase, 27 H ow ell 1281 (1 8 0 0 ).
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suffered from severe delusions that God was commanding him to be a martyr. He was, in
his own mind, “trying to save mankind.” ’
Fingarette argues that the Hadfield case demonstrates that, on a reasonable
interpretation o f M ’Naghten and ALI, these tests run the risk o f directing the jury to reach
the wrong verdict. In other words, a jury may be led to incorrectly determine that
Hadfield was sane and guilty, due to the fact that he either “understood the wrongness o f
his actions,” or that he “appreciated the criminality of his conduct.
Yet another example that Fingarette uses to demonstrate his case, concerns a
defendant who is eerily reminiscent o f Andrea Yates. This case involves a mother
suffering from post-partum psychosis, and who upon having her first child, had severe
symptoms o f hallucination, delusion, and psychotic behavior.’*’^ As it turns out, with
regard to this first child, the mother suffered from destructive infanticidal thoughts, but
_she never acted on them, “and after weeks she had recovered, after experiencing a
delusional ecstasy o f rebirth herself.” 'H o w e v e r , four years later, eight weeks after the
birth o f her second child, the woman strangled that new baby.'"'® W hat’s interesting, is
that in between the two episodes, she led a normal life and carried on quite well, but
during the second episode, post-partum psychosis quickly took effect, and she killed the
child. Fingarette, argues that in many respects this woman was rational, and on a
reasonable interpretation, the woman purposefully, voluntarily, and knowingly strangled

Ibid.
Fingarette, 138, 14 9 -1 5 0 , 176-177.
""Ibid.. 140-141.
Ibid., 140.
Ibid.
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the c h i l d . B u t again, Fingarette argues that by following M Wag/z/e» or ALI, the
woman may be incorrectly found criminally sane, due to the fact that she “knew that what
she was doing was wrong,” or similarly, that she “appreciated the criminality o f her
actions.” '
These examples are designed to demonstrate that ntiihQT M ’N aghten nor ALI
embodies our common sense intuition about criminal insanity.'^’ These examples also
are designed to show that the addition o f a noncognitivist reading o f the criminal insanity
test is to be preferred to a purely cognitivist one, or, in other words, that an evaluation o f
the emotions, desires, wants, likes, and dislikes o f the defendant is necessary for a proper
determination o f insanity.'^" Thus, while it may be reasonable to suppose that Hadfield,
Fish, and the psychotic mother were able to respond relevantly to essential relevance in a
simple propositional sense, it is not the case that these actors had the requisite emotional
ability to respond relevantly to essential relevance. This, according to Fingarette, is at
least partly what renders it clear that the actors cannot be sane.'^^
Fingarette's second type of argument, an argument from everyday language, claims
that, contrary to how they might appear, the common sense idioms that we use to
describe a case like Hadfield or the psychotic mother, really mean something about the
irrationality o f the actor. Here, in a long but informative passage, Fingarette expresses
this view quite clearly;

Ibid., 176.
Ibid., 139-141.
Ibid., 137.
Ibid., 139-141, 148.
163

Fingarette, 177; Fingarette and Fiasse, 237.
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We say o f a person who is insane that he is irrational. When he manifests his
insanity in his conduct, it is natural to speak o f his conduct as irrational ...
Hadfield was a man who wished to be put to death, as a scandal to his society, in
order to play his God-Ordained role as the new Christ .. .The psychotic mother,
agonizingly depressed, feeling that the world was filled with suffering and sin,
tortured by the conviction that her child faced a life o f nothing but suffering and
sin, skillfully arranged matters so that she could undisturbingly put her infant to a
relatively quick and painless death ... Her act was irrational ... Her conduct,
however, was self-initiated, voluntary, skillfully carried out toward the clearly
conceived end she had in mind ...O ne could say, idiomatically, that the mother
was in the grip o f an irrational mood and that she could not help what she was
doing. One could say o f Hadfield that he did not really understand his act .. .Then
we might elaborate and go on to say that the mother could not help what she was
doing because she was irrational, and that Hadfield did not really know what he
was doing because he was irrational ... However, [the phrase] ‘she could not
control h erself is an idiom stressing that the irrationality shows itself most
dramatically in the motive ... [and the phrase] ‘he doesn’t truly understand his
action’ is an idiom stressing that irrationality is most apparent in connection with
his beliefs and attitudes.'^

As these examples express, the most clear and obvious case where Fingarette focuses
on the everyday language arguments, is the so-called “loss o f control idioms.” '
Namely, Fingarette argues that when the meaning o f “loss o f control” is analyzed
properly, we will find that it does not mean things like “being overwhelmed by emotion”
or “losing one's free agency,” but rather, typically means something else: “Thus, when
we say idiomatically ... ‘he couldn’t control him self,’ what we are getting at is that,
although he literally could and did control what he was doing, he was doing something
that was to a significant extent inconsistent with most of his other usual
inclinations ...

Elsewhere Fingarette says:

One source o f error connected with the metaphors or analogies involved in these
idioms lies in analogizing desire, mood, or emotion to “forces,”. .. forces that can

'^ I b id ., pg. 175-177.
Ibid., 158-172.
166

Ibid., 166.
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be quantitatively too great for the “governing power of the w ill’ to curb, and which
therefor destroy the will or drive the person against his will.""^

Thus Fingarette’s fundamental position is that, according to the way we use everyday
language, the common sense idioms such as “he couldn’t control himself,’’ usually do not
mean something about the volition o f the actor. Instead, they are claims about a persons
normal actions, habits, or as Fingarette says, “ ... something [that reveals that] to a
significant extent [the persons actions] are inconsistent with most o f his other usual
inclinations.’’ Thus, this alleged feature o f the loss o f control idioms, supports
Fingarette’s model for criminal insanity, because it conforms to the everyday ascriptions
o f people.
The final element o f Fingarette’s analysis o f criminal insanity concerns the role o f
mental disease. While mental disease is not mentioned in Fingarette’s test for insanity, it
is worth noting the special meaning that he gives to it in order to understand why it isn’t
mentioned and thus to properly understand his a c c o u n t . F o r Fingarette, “mental
disease” is a social concept, and not a medical one.'^^ Specifically, “mental disease” is
described as a “cross-dimensional concept.” ’’’ By this, he means that it is a concept that
must be understood by reference to various norms o f society.” ' Just as the notion o f
“adequate vision” depends on the situation in which one is using the term (e.g., for

Ibid.
S ee fn. 144 above.
S ee generally, 19-52.
™ Ibid., 23 , 37-43.
Ibid., 37 -4 3 .

17: Ibid.,

3 9 -4 0 .
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getting a drivers license, or for being a jeweler), so too is this the case with mental
disease. In criminal insanity, mental disease must be understood against the backdrop o f
the criminal law and its p u r p o s e s . T h i s purpose concerns the morally correct
determination o f moral agency, which is to be justified by the “widely held ethical-legal
notions o f our culture:” '
All o f this surely suggests, indeed it almost certainly proves, that the concepts o f
insanity and mental disease, as relevant to the criminal law, must have a meaning
and a rationale that are not tied to any specific causal or physical hypothesis at all.
The meaning and rationale must be rooted deeply and widely in the ethical-legal
notions of our culture, in our everyday notions o f human nature and human
relations, rather than a special, esoteric, or technical notion tied to some particular
causal hypothesis or technical information.'^^

Fingarette thus argues that, for the purposes o f the law, the concept o f “mental
disease” gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for criminal i n s a n i t y . H e r e ,
Fingarette says that the notion o f mental disease “ ... amounts to the idea that the person
whose mind is such that he lacks the capacity to act rationally cannot be a responsible
person and hence cannot fairly be held morally responsible.” '^^ In this sense, the
inclusion o f the “mental disease” component in Fingarette’s test for criminal insanity is
simply redundant, because the determination o f a lack o f culpability would already be
contained in the meaning o f “mental disease.” Thus, for the purposes o f the criminal law,
according to Fingarette, “mental disease” is just another word for “criminal insanity.” '

17.'

' ' Ibid., 45 .
Ibid., 23
Ibid.
Ibid., 23, 173.

177

Ibid., 23.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38

In summary o f Fingarette’s model for criminal insanity, then, we can see that the most
important feature o f his account is the notion o f criminal (ir)rationality, or as Fingarette’s
test says, the “substantial capacity to respond relevantly to essential relevance.” ' T h i s
central notion is meant to be interpreted in both a cognitive and noncognitive sense, as it
applies to the criminality o f the defendant’s conduct.'®” In accordance with Fingarette’s
view, a jury should focus on whether or not the defendant has the requisite “rational
beliefs” and “rational emotions” with respect to those aspects of the defendant’s
environment that are relevant to the criminal act, in order to determine whether or not he
or she can “respond relevantly to essential relevance." In this sense, Fingarette’s account
is grounded in what Lawrie Reznek calls the notion o f substantive rationality, meaning
that what justifies Fingarette’s test are judgments about what the defendant ought
rationally to believe, feel, or value in certain situations.'®'
Implicit in Fingarette’s adoption o f criminal irrationality as the central determiner of
criminal insanity is his rejection o f the concepts o f volition, mental disease, and
wrongness, as well as the concepts o f appreciate, know, understand, and nature and
quality that are contained in M 'Naghten and/or ALI.'®" Fingarette argues that these
concepts should not be included in criminal insanity tests for a variety o f reasons, most
prominent o f which are: ( 1 ) The inclusion o f these concepts in insanity tests is

Ibid.

See 25-28 above.
Ibid., 29 -3 0 .
Ibid.. 28.
Ibid.. 2 8 -2 9 , 3 1 -3 5 .3 8 -3 9 .
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contradicted by common sense intuition in certain paradigm cases of i n s a n i t y . (2).
These concepts fail to allow for the relevant legal-ethical norms o f our culture to be
subsumed under the test(s) that contains them .’®'^ (3). These concepts fail to conform to
the everyday ascription’s o f human behavior that are relevant to criminal insanity.'*^
B. Lawrie Reznek
1.

Preliminary Summarv. Lawrie Reznek’s test for criminal insanity is certainly

different from both Fingarette’s, and the tests o f M'Naghten, Irresistible Impulse,
Durham, and ALI. But while there are some significant differences between these
accounts, there are also some similarities.
Reznek and Fingarette both find certain aspects o f the current criminal insanity tests
that were discussed in Sections I and II objectionable.'^^ This includes the objection that
M ’N aghten represents an overly narrow test, in the sense that the language o f “knows,”
and “understands,” does not have sufficient noncognitive connotations.'^^ Or at any rate,
that even if “knows” and “understands” do allow for noncognitive interpretations, that
these terms have often been construed by the courts in an exclusively cognitive sense,
and as such, are too n a r r o w . T h u s , like Fingarette, Reznek holds that his test for
criminal insanity must include the noncognitive mental states o f the defendant, and not
merely his or her cognitive states."'*^

Ibid., 31 -3 5 .
Ibid., 2 8 -2 9 , 37-39.
Ibid.. 35 -3 7 .
S ee sec- ITI, A, 1 and 2 o f this paper for specific citations o f Fingarette's view s.
R eznek, 153-161.

run Ibid., 153-160.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40

A second area in criminal insanity jurisprudence that both Fingarette and Reznek find
objectionable, is the inclusion o f a mental disease prong found in M ’N aghten, Durham,
and ALl.'^'^ Both Reznek and Fingarette object to the use o f “mental disease” in the
traditional tests, because both view mental disease as a social concept, as opposed to a
medical o n e T ' Thus, like Fingarette, Reznek finds M'Naghten, Durham, and ALI in
error, because these tests run the risk o f incorrectly placing the psychologist in the
fundamental role of ethical expert (particularly Durham). In short, this is because there is
a strong tendency in the courts to treat mental disease as if it were a technical medical
concept that requires a special expertise to apprehend, when, according to Fingarette and
Reznek, mental disease is nothing o f the kind.'^‘
However, while there are significant overlaps between Fingarette and Reznek's views,
they also differ with respect to many other important aspects o f criminal insanity. While
Fingarette basically rejects all o f the central concepts that have traditionally been used in
the insanity t e s t s , Reznek chooses to retain some o f these concepts. The first concept
that Reznek retains is that o f volition.’*^' Unlike Fingarette, Reznek argues that a
volitional prong is needed to adequately capture our moral intuitions regarding certain

Ibid.. 160.
R eznek, 2 0 0 -2 0 4 2 0 6 . 222.

"" Ibid.
'"-Ibid., 219-222.
S ee sec. Ill, 1 and 2 above.
Ibid., 3 0 7 -3 1 0 .
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cases o f criminal i n s a n i t y . T h u s , Reznek retains this essential understanding which is
contained in both the Irresistible Impulse test and ALI.'*^*
Another area that Reznek finds acceptable in the traditional tests, but which is rejected
by Fingarette, concerns the role that a criminality/wrongness prong should play in
criminal insanity jurisprudence.'’^^ Whereas Fingarette’s account o f insanity employs the
concept o f criminality that is contained in ALI, Reznek argues that ALI’s application is
too narrow, thus running the risk o f producing a guilty verdict when in fact it should yield
NG BI.’^^ In this sense, Reznek affirms the “wrongness” concept \n M ’N aghten.
However, whereas M Naghten requires that a defendant “know” that his or her action was
wrong, Reznek essentially substitutes the concept o f “know” with that o f “appreciate,”
thus synthesizing these two aspects o f ALI and M Naghten.
The final two senses in which Reznek’s and Fingarette’s accounts differ concern the
role that criminal irrationality should play in the insanity tests, as well the unique role that
the concepts o f “good” and “evil” should play.“^'' Regarding the role o f criminal
irrationality, Reznek denies that irrationality in Fingarette’s sense is either necessary or
sufficient for criminal insanity.""' He has at least two basic reasons for this. First, he
argues that the notion o f substantive rationality used by Fingarette depends on a

Ibid., 2 9 -3 2 , 91-92.
S p ecifically, R eznek's volitional prong differs from ALI and Irresistible Impulse. See 309.
Reznek, 309.
A lthough Reznek d oes not sp ecifically say this, it follow s from his test. Sec 309.
Ibid., 309.
R eznek. 173-188.
Ibid., 199.
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controversial objective value hierarchy that, when applied to cases, is unreasonable."^'^
Second, he argues that there are persuasive counterexamples to using rationality for
determining criminal insanity."*''^ Thus, according to Reznek, not only does Fingarette’s
notion o f criminal irrationality depend on controversial values, but it also seems to
contradict our common sense intuitions.
Second, regarding the concepts o f “good” and “evil,” Reznek argues that a morally
correct insanity test must include these concepts."®"* For Reznek, in order to have a
proper understanding o f criminal insanity, it is necessary to include the notion that a
person can be “transformed from a good character into an evil one,” and that this can
provide an excuse."®^ This provision, which is interesting because it reverts back to the
basic concepts that were used in Good-Evil test o f 1313,"®^ requires that a jury evaluate
the character o f the defendant in terms o f whether or not he or she is a “good” or “evil”
before he or she committed the crime.
2.

Detailed Discussion. Reznek argues that an adequate test for criminal insanity

should include four principal components. These are: (1). The noncognitive concept o f
“appreciate.”"®^ (2). The moral concept o f “wrongness.”'®^ (3). The volitional prong o f

Ibid., 174-184.
Ibid.
Ibid., 307 -3 0 9 .
Ibid.
S ee sec. II, A, 5-6 above. H ow ever, Reznek prefers to think o f good an evil in “naturalized” sense,
as opp osed to a Biblical sense. “E v il.” in this sense, is understood in terms o f a “propensity to harm others
in the pursuit o f his ow n selfish interests.” S ee Reznek, 13.
Ibid., 309.
2(IS

Ibid.
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being “unable to control his actions.”'®*^ (4). A “good/evil” prong.

Reznek's test treats

these components disjunctively. It reads:
Someone is NGBI if he is suffering from a mental illness at the time of the offence
such that (I) he was unable to appreciate what he was doing or whether it was
wrong, or (2) he was unable to control his actions, or (3) he was transformed from
a good character into an evil one."' '
Since we have been considering Fingarette’s model, which holds that a distinctive
kind o f irrationality is the central determiner for criminal insanity, 1 will first address the
notable omission o f irrationality from Reznek's insanity test. I will then proceed to
explain Reznek’s view with respect to the four remaining components o f this paper, those
o f “volition,” “criminality/morality,” “mental disease,” and “cognitive/noncognitive.”
Finally, I will address the unique role that Reznek ascribes to the concepts o f “good/evil.”
The first major criticism that Reznek has o f Fingarette’s account is that his test for
insanity depends on the notion o f substantive rationality,”' a n d that this notion assumes
an objective''^ value hierarchy that is controversial and extremely difficult to justify
when applied to cases."'"^ This objective value hierarchy is made explicit by Fingarette
when he discusses the “norms” that are to justify his appeal to the concept o f “responding
relevantly to essential relevance:” “These norms are not only norms o f correct inference
or valid argument; they are norms regarding what emotions, or moods, or attitudes, or
desires are in some sense suitable or proper with respect to certain other aspects o f one's

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.. 178-179.
’ Ibid., 178. What is meant by ‘'objective” in this context is, “independent o f the subjective
p references” o f actors.
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situation ...

In this sense, Fingarette’s “norms” are treated as objective values

through which third person observers like jurors can determine that an actor “failed to
respond relevantly to essential relevance with respect to the criminality o f his or her
conduct.”
In order to see specifically how these objective values that Reznek is talking about are
exemplified in a paradigm case of insanity, and why Reznek holds that these values are
needed in the determination o f criminal insanity according to Fingarette’s model,
consider Fingarette’s test as it applies to M ’N a g h t e n Recall that Daniel M ’Naghten
was a paranoid schizophrenic who, acting under the apparent delusion that he was being
persecuted by the Tories, shot Edward Drummond, the man who he incorrectly thought
was the leader o f the Tories, Robert Peel.“'^ Under Fingarette’s test, in order to
determine that M ’Naghten was insane when he killed Drummond, a jury would need to
determine that M ’Naghten lacked a substantial capacity to respond relevantly to essential
relevance with respect to criminality. However, simply knowing that M ’Naghten lacked
a substantial capacity to respond relevantly to essential relevance with respect to
criminality, does not explicitly reveal the sense in which these objective values that
Reznek is referring to are assumed by Fingarette’s test for criminal insanity. In order to

Ibid., 174-184.
Fingarette, 183.
Reznek d oes not g iv e any exam ples o f h ow these “objective values" are exem plified by Fingarette's
specific test for insanity, nor d o es he g iv e any exam ples that demonstrate why these objective values are
needed within the framework o f Fingarette's test specifically. Therefore, 1 w ill attempt to fill in som e o f
these gaps. H ence, these next four paragraph represents m y m ost charitable attempt to demonstrate
p recisely how and w hy these objective values are required by Fingarette's account. 1 also want to make it
clear that, although 1 agree with Reznek that Fingarette's account depends on som e objective values. 1 do
not necessarily agree that Fingarette's account m ust depend on the more specific values that Reznek argues
it d oes. S ee 47-51 below .
217
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properly understand this, it is necessary to inquire into what the concepts o f “responding
relevantly” and “essential relevance” mean as they are used in the courtroom.
In accordance with Fingarette’s previous illustration o f responding relevantly to
essential relevance,

the basic meaning o f this central concept as it relates to

M ’Naghten’s case can be captured by the following counterfactual. This counterfactual
implicitly contains the objective values to which Reznek refers: If M ’Naghten were sane,
he would have been able to respond in

that we feel he should (i.e., “respond

relevantly”) to those things or beliefs in his life that we feel he should respond to, or that
sane and moral persons do in fact respond to (i.e., “to essential relevance” ).

Thus, in

attempting to judge the relative sanity/insanity o f M ’Naghten in accordance with
Fingarette’s test, it is necessary for the jury pick out which aspects o f M ’Naghten’s life
should constitute “responding relevantly,” and which aspects should constitute “essential
relevance” with respect to criminality. These objective values, then, are values
concerning “where to look,” and “what to look for,” in the defendant's life that are
relevant to criminality. For instance, it is likely that if a jury were using Fingarette’s test
to determine the respective sanity/insanity o f M ’Naghten, the jury would have picked out
M ’Naghten’s irrational belief that Drummond was the leader o f the Tories (responding
relevantly), insofar as it relates to M ’Naghten’s other belief that the Tories were trying to
kill him (essential relevance), to determine that he was insane. That is, a jury would look

S ee sec. Ill, A. ii, 2 4 -2 9 above o f the case Jones and Smith case. This, recall, is a case that Fingarette
uses to explain and illustrate his the central notion o f “responding relevantly to essential relevance.” The
present application o f Fingarctte's test to M ’Naghten parallels that o f the Jones and Smith case. H owever,
in the present application, the sp ecific value terms in Fingarette’s test are made explicit.
S ee sec. Ill, A, ii, 24-28. T his is, in essen ce, what Fingarette is saying in the Jones and Smith case,
w hen Jones d oes not respond relevantly to Sm ith’s presence in the bushes. That is. Jones lacks substantial
capacity to behave in w ays that w e feel his should, with respect to certain other aspects in his life that are
considered relevant to criminality.
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at M ’Naghten’s beliefs and the way in which these beliefs are related to each other and to
criminality, to determine that M ’Naghten lacked a substantial capacity to respond
relevantly to essential relevance. In this sense, the basic objective value that is assumed
by Fingarette’s test, is that M ’Naghten’s beliefs, and the way in which these beliefs are
related to each other and to criminality, are sufficient for determining insanity."^
However, just as it is clear under Fingarette’s test, that a jury could reasonably pick
out M ’Naghten’s irrational beliefs in order to determine his criminal (ir)rationality, it is
also clear that a jury could pick out other aspects o f M ’Naghten’s life to determine his
respective culpability."'’ These other aspects, in turn, would assume different objective
values for determining that M ’Naghten had or lacked a substantial capacity to respond
relevantly to essential relevance. For instance, hypothetically, a juror, if he or she were
so inclined, could pick out some strange fact(s) about M ’Naghten’s behavior(s) in order
to determine that M ’Naghten was criminally irrational. Perhaps a behavior o f
M ’Naghten’s that a jury might pick out would be that M ’Naghten soiled his pants
(responding relevantly) when he heard a chickadee sing (essential relevance). Or
similarly, in a more realistic scenario, a jury might pick out the fact that M ’Naghten
previously had stuck needles in him self (responding relevantly) when a Tory member
was present (essential relevance).'"" In these cases, a jury may believe that the bizarre

One can, how ever, break down this basic value judgm ent into more specific value judgem ents. For
instance, there is the more sp ecific value judgm ent that, the aspect o f M Naghten s life that is sufficient for
determ ining insanity is his b eliefs, as opposed to his actions, for instance. And there is the more specific
value judgem ent that, the w ay the particular b eliefs X and Y are related to each other and to criminality are
sufficient for determ ining criminal insanity. For Reznek s argument against the latter value judgm ent, see
the discu ssion in sec. Ill, B, ii, 5 2 -5 7 below .
’’ ’ Fingarette and H asse, 227; Fingarette. 175-177.
T his description is meant to parallel the considerations that Fingarette treats as relevant in his
description o f Fish, viz., his sticking needles in him self. See Fingarette. 177.
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nature o f these behaviors are p ro o f that M 'Naghten must have been criminally insane
when he shot Drummond, which is clearly a value judgement. “No sane man would act
in such unintelligible ways," a juror might reason.
According to Reznek, then, Fingarette’s test requires objective values in order to
determine what should constitute “responding relevantly” to “essential relevance."''^
Fingarette’s test requires, in other words, that a jury look at the right aspects o f the
defendant’s life in order to determine the respective sanity/insanity o f the defendant, and
that a jury correctly determine the way that these aspects are related to criminality'.
However, as was alluded to in the above hypothetical scenarios regarding M ’Naghten’s
bizarre behaviors, and as Reznek argues, it is clear that at least some o f these aspects o f a
defendant’s life that a jury may focus on to determine criminal insanity under
Fingarette’s test, and thus some o f the objective values that are implicit in this
determination, are controversial.""^ Particularly, if these aspects o f a defendant’s life,
concern all or even most o f the defendant’s beliefs, moods, emotions, behaviors, etc. that
are considered “bizarre,” “strange,” “unintelligible,” or "inappropriate.”
Ultimately Reznek argues that the notion o f responding relevantly to essential
relevance allows for, and perhaps requires, that a jury determine the sanity/insanity o f the
defendant using whatever norms or objective values they believe are relevant to the
case.""^ This includes those objective norms that are implicit in the adjectives that
Fingarette uses to describe cases o f insanity, i.e., “distorted,” unintelligible,” "improper,”
“inappropriate,” etc. Reznek cites Fingarette’s description of Fish as evidence that the

’ Reznek, 178-179.
R eznek. 174-184.
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notion o f responding relevantly to essential relevance relies on the controversial values
that are in question; “[Fish’s] emotional reactions and desires were in some respects so
distorted that he had not the capacity to act rationally insofar as these came into play.”‘~^
Similarly, Reznek argues that these objective values that, as Reznek says, get the notion
o f responding relevantly essential relevance “o ff the g r o u n d , a r e visible in
Fingarette’s assessment o f psychopaths (cited previously on page 29):
Individuals with psychopathic personalities may manifest a bizarre insensitivity or
a purposefully cultivated but now deep-rooted callousness that enables them to
commit crimes o f peculiarly inhuman or cruel kinds. ... If the facts do show
chronic generalized failure to develop human relationships-i.e., a generalized
incapacity to respond with feelings to the sufferings, agonies or death o f human
beings— then we do indeed have grounds to view the individual as criminally
irrational.

In cases such as that o f Fish and psychopaths in general, Reznek argues that it is the
values that are entailed by such adjectives as, “insensitive,” “callous,” “improper,”
“distorted,” and/or “unintelligible,” that Fingarette specifically appeals to as the
fundamental indicator o f s a n i t y / i n s a n i t y . I n the case o f psychopaths, the adjectives
that are used are those o f insensitivity' and callousness as they relate to the psychopath's
cruel acts. According to Reznek, Fingarette’s use o f such adjectives suggest that any>
beliefs, emotions, desires, values, and actions that a jury may find relevant to insanity
may be used in the determination, so long as these aspects of the defendant's life are

Reznek, 1 74-184; see above discussion, 44-47.
--^Fingarette, 177; Reznek, 179-180.
R eznek, 178.
Fingarette and H asse, 237; Reznek, 176-177.
Reznek, 174-181; See in Fingarette on 177, 185. 2 11where uses these types o f adjectives to describe
criminal insanity, and in Fingarette and H asse. 237.
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considered as sufficiently contrary to our n o r m s . H e r e Reznek says, “Fish’s values are
so flawed that Fingarette concludes that he is irrational and insane ... and Fingarette and
Hasse argue that psychopaths are ‘not rational in regard to law ,’ because they do not
value human life.”"’'
The ultimate problem that Reznek has with this broad understanding o f what should
constitute responding relevantly to essential relevance is that once these values
concerning what beliefs or behaviors are “unsuitable,” “improper,” “distorted,”
“inappropriate,” or “callous” “irrational,” are actually applied to all criminal cases, many
defendants that should be found guilty o f a crime, will in fact be found NGBI."

Thus,

although Fingarette’s test works in the paradigm cases of criminal insanity, Reznek
argues that Fingarette’s test is far too easy to satisfy.'"''^ Indeed, according to Reznek,
Fingarette’s test runs the risk o f providing an excuse for all criminals:
W hen a person breaks the law or a moral rule, it is because he has different values.
When a person steals, or murders, it is because he does not care sufficiently about
the suffering he causes. But this does not mean that all criminals should be
excused. This would make the category o f criminal or evil person disappear.

Here Reznek argues that Fingarette’s account could entail that all criminals should not be
held responsible for their behavior. This is because criminals often have subjective
beliefs and values that contradict the objective beliefs and values concerning what is and
what is not “appropriate,” “proper,” “intelligible,” or “rational.” As was mentioned
230

R e z n e k .174-181.
Ibid.. 180.

-'-R e z n e k , 179-180. T his includes psychopaths. A ccording to Reznek psychopaths clearly are not
insane.
2 .3.3

Ibid.
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above,"^^ this defiance o f Fingarette’s objective values concerning what should constitute
responding relevantly to essential relevance, is exemplified in a criminal defendant’s
substantial incapacity to respond with the right beliefs, emotions, attitudes, actions, etc.,
(i.e., respond relevantly) to the defendant’s other beliefs, emotions, attitudes, actions, etc.,
(i.e., to essential relevance) that are considered relevant to criminality. Thus, because all
criminals seem, in some sense, to lack a substantial capacity to respond with the right
beliefs, emotions, attitudes, actions etc., to those other beliefs, emotions, attitudes, actions
etc., that are considered relevant to criminality, Reznek argues that all criminals, at least
theoretically, have an excuse in accordance with Fingarette’s account of “responding
relevantly to essential relevance."'’^
Consider, for instance, how Fingarette’s test for insanity seems to yield the same
NGBI verdict in both the Fish case,'^^ and in a case involving the “common criminal.’’
In the Fish case, Fingarette assesses Fish’s mental status by saying that, his “emotional
reactions and desires were in some respects so distorted” that he could not “respond
relevantly to essential relevance.” However, if we consider these emotional reactions and
desires as they apply to the common criminal who clearly is not insane (e.g., a watch
thief), it can be argued that Fingarette’s test seems to get the same verdict o f NGBI,
which is obviously incorrect. Just as Fish's desires and emotional reactions may be
“distorted” to such an extent that they may contradict the norms that we believe are
“proper or suitable,” so too does this seem to be the case with a watch thief. Indeed, a

Ibid.
S ee sec.. Ill, A , ii, 4 4 -4 5 .
Ibid.
S ee sec. Ill, A, 32 above.
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watch th ief may easily believe that he “deserves” all the watches he can get his hands on
because society treats him unfairly. Thus, in accordance with Reznek’s critique o f
Fingarette’s view, a jury may find the watch thief NGBI, because the watch thief may
lack a substantial capacity to have the right beliefs and emotions (respond relevantly)
with respect to the belief that society treats him unfairly (essential re le v a n c e ).'T h u s ,
being in the grip o f such a belief, the watch thief continues to steal watches, i.e., he fails
to respond relevantly to essential relevance.
In short, then, according to Reznek, Fingarette’s notion o f “responding relevantly to
essential relevance” does not distinguish between these cases with respect to their
differences in culpability.'^^ That is, it does not distinguish a so-called paradigm case o f
insanity like that o f Fish, from a case in which it is equally obvious that the criminal is
sane. Both may have values that contradict norms that we consider proper. Both may
have beliefs and emotions that we consider improper with respect to certain aspects o f
their lives about which we feel they should have different beliefs and emotions. Hence,
both are not culpable in accordance with Fingarette’s view."'^® But this, Reznek argues, is
an absurd conclusion. Clearly a test which does not distinguish between a so-called
paradigm case o f insanity and a case involving the common criminal must be rejected.''^'

R eznek, 17 9 -]8 1 .
- ’‘'R ezn ek , 179-181.
H ow ever, I do b eliev e that Fingarette has a response to this criticism. Even though the notion o f
“responding relevantly to essential relevance” does require certain values for determining what can qualify
as “responding relevantly” to “essential relevance,” I b elieve that Fingarette would argue that, as a matter
o f fact, jurors w ill not let ju st anv bizarre or inappropriate behavior or b e lie f be used in the insanity test. It
w ould on ly be the extrem ely bizarre behaviors and b eliefs that are grounded in com mon sense intuition and
everyday language ascriptions as they pertain to moral responsibility. See sec.. Ill, A, ii, 24-39 above.
R eznek, 176-184.
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Reznek’s second argument for the omission o f a rationality prong from criminal
insanity tests, is quite different. Whereas the first argument is a type o f reductio ad
absurdem o f Fingarette’s account, the conclusion o f which is that many criminals might
not be held morally responsible for their criminal behavior, this second type o f argument
rests on a set o f hypothetical cases which are meant to provide counterexamples to
Fingarette’s view. In particular, these cases are meant to provide counterexamples to two
o f the senses in which criminal irrationality, or the “ability to respond relevantly to
essential relevance,’’ may manifest in the defendant- cognitively and noncognitively.""^*
Thus, in order for a jury to properly determine whether an actor is criminally insane
under Fingarette’s test, a jury must at least evaluate the actor’s beliefs, attitudes, desires,
emotions, etc., (i.e., his or her responding relevantly) with respect to those other beliefs,
attitudes, desires, emotions, etc., (i.e., to essential relevance) that are related to the
criminality in question.*"*’ This means, in accordance with Fingarette’s view, that the
jury must focus on at least whether or not the defendant had the requisite “rational
emotions,’’ or “rational beliefs’’ in order to determine whether or not the actor had the
capacity to respond relevantly to essential relevance insofar as criminality is concerned.
Reznek ultimately argues that, when these concepts such as “irrational emotion’’ and
“irrational b e lief’ are examined insofar as they relate to exculpation, Fingarette’s account
is mistaken, because, in and o f themselves, irrational desires, emotions, and beliefs are
not relevant to the determination o f criminal insanity.*"*"* This is because there are
obvious cases, according to Reznek, in which a criminal is irrational, but where our

Ibid., 174-184.
S ee sec. Ill, A, ii, 31-36 above
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common sense intuitions reveals that the criminal should not have an excuse simply
based on his or her irrationality alone.
Reznek uses two sorts o f examples to make this case.'"^^ Consider, first, a concept that
Fingarette argues is particularly important in evaluating the Fish case.“'*^ This is the
concept o f an irrational emotion.^"^^ Because Fingarette does not explicitly discuss what
is meant by an “irrational emotion,” Reznek proposes a way o f understanding this
concept. Flis proposal relies on Phillipa Foot’s analysis that, “an emotion is irrational if
the belief on which it should be based is either absent or irrational.”"'^^ With this analysis
in mind, Reznek asks us to consider a pair o f examples, where irrational fear o f spiders is
considered in relation to criminal responsibility:
W hen I am frightened by a spider, my emotion is based on the belief that 1 am in
danger. The emotion is rational if the spider is a black widow, and irrational if the
spider is a harmless house spider. But, does this mean that a person fearful of
house spiders is insane? What if Gertrude attacks such a person showing her a
spider? Is she NGBI? If Gertrude believes her life is endangered, she has an
excuse ... Contrast this with Bob who also has an irrational fear o f spiders, and
attacks the spiders in his house with cyanide fumes, knowing full well the risk to
others. Someone is killed. Bob does not have an excuse because he does not suffer
from exculpatory ignorance ... Irrational emotions per se do not excuse.*'^'’

In these passages, Reznek asks whether our common sense intuitions reject the claim that
irrational emotions, in and o f themselves, should provide an excuse. Thus, Reznek
argues in the first part o f his example, that Gertrude’s irrational fear of house spiders is

R eznek, 175-1 7 9 ,1 9 9
Ibid., 175-176. 180-181.
Fingarette, 175-177.
Ibid.
R eznek, 175.
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not the concept that docs the work in demonstrating her criminal insanity (if she is indeed
insane) when she “attacks a person showing her a spider.” In order to see why this is the
case, Reznek contrasts Gertrude’s irrational fear o f spiders with Bob’s. In Bob’s case, he
too responds to his irrational fear o f spiders by committing some form o f possible
violence against someone else. But, Bob does so by “using cyanide fumes, knowing full
well the risk to others.” Obviously, Bob is not criminally insane even though his actions
spring from an irrational fear, and moreover, his actions may appear “bizarre,”
“senseless,” or “unintelligible.” However, Gertrude very well may have the defense of
criminal insanity available to her. This is because, while Bob does seem to “appreciate
his actions and that they are wrong,” Gertrude does not. Reznek argues that these cases
suggest that irrational emotions do not determine criminal insanity.'^^ This is because
our intuition tells us in these examples that the culpability o f Bob and Gertrude was
dependent, not on our knowing whether or not their emotions were based on rational
beliefs, but rather whether they appreciated the harm they might inflict on others by their
actions. These examples suggest that Fingarette’s test, a test which does entail that
irrational emotions, in and o f themselves, can provide an excuse (depending on the extent
to which they appear “bizarre,” “senseless,” or “unintelligible”), must be mistaken.-^'
Now consider the Gertrude and Bob example as it directly applies to the case of Fish,
thus allowing us to see just how Reznek’s and Fingarette’s perspectives differ in an actual
case. Whereas, under Fingarette’s test. Fish is found criminally insane, because Fish's
emotional reactions and desires were irrational with respect to those beliefs that he may

Ibid., 175-176.
Ibid., 177, 180-183, 199.
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have had that are associated with his cannibalism or his sticking needles in him self,'^' for
Reznek, if Fish genuinely is criminally insane, it must be something specific about Fish's
irrational emotions, viz., that they fail to correspond to the wrongness that is inherent in
cannibalism and rnurder/^^ Thus, in a similar manner that Bob should not be found
criminally insane simply because his criminal actions were associated with his irrational
fear o f spiders, so too is it the case that Fish’s irrational emotions that were associated
with his camiibalizing children, cannot, in and of itself, be grounds for exculpation.
Instead, under Reznek's analysis, we would need to know certain other more specific
facts about Fish’s life that were connected to his irrational e m o t i o n s . W e would need
to know, for instance, that Fish’s cannibalization of children was in response to his belief
that God is commanding him, or something o f the sort. In other words, for Reznek, the
concepts which need to be employed in the judgment o f Fish’s culpability, are the more
focused concepts o f his ability to “appreciate his actions and that they are wrong,” or as
we see later see, those that concern volition, good, and evil."*’'’ Whereas, for Fingarette
the concept that needs to be employed is that o f “responding relevantly to essential
relevance,” as it pertains to the defendant’s cognitive and noncognitive mental states.
Reznek proposes that a similar analysis applies to the notion of “irrational ends” or
irrational beliefs."^^’ In the exact same fashion that the concept of irrational emotions is

Ibid.
S ee sec. II, A, ii. 32.
-•’ R eznek, 197-199.
Ibid.
S ee sec. Ill, B, ii, 59-7 0 .
Ibid., 180-181.
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neither necessary nor sufficient for the legal meaning of criminal insanity, so too is this
the case with the concept o f irrational ends, thus revealing that whether the irrationality is
noncognitive or cognitive, the same considerations apply. Reznek offers a
counterexample to challenge the claim that irrational ends, in and of themselves, can
provide an e x c u s e . S u p p o s e that someone’s ultimate end is happiness and he or she
believed that money will bring them to achieve it. Suppose that it in the process o f
robbing a bank to satisfy this end, he or she murdered one o f the tellers. Clearly, we
would not excuse this defendant based on this sort o f irrationality.

This is because our

moral intuitions do not suggest that an irrational end such as, “believing money will bring
us happiness,” is enough for the negation o f moral responsibility. Thus, even if a
defendant’s end o f “believing money will bring us happiness” (essential relevance) led to
his or her other belief that he or she should attempt to “control the oil reserves” (respond
relevantly), which resulted in the defendant "dropping a bomb on the entire state of
Texas,” (criminality), according to Reznek, these “bizarre” and “crazy" beliefs should not
yield a NGBI verdict.
In short, then, for Reznek, the concepts that better explain the exculpatory force o f
criminal insanity (than that o f irrationality) are the more traditional concepts of, “the
inability to appreciate what he was doing or whether it was wrong.”"^^ According to
Reznek, a test which employs these respective noncognitive and moral concepts, is much
more consistent with our common sense moral intuition, and is not susceptible to obvious
counterexamples, such as those involving Gertrude, Bob, and the person with irrational

Ibid.
Ibid.
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ends.‘^° Moreover, an account such as this is also not subject to the earlier criticism that
it depends on a highly controversial, and perhaps indefensible, objective value
h i e r a r c h y . T h i s is because, for Reznek, the notion o f appreciating what he was doing
or whether it was wrong, does not depend on the controversial values that are implicit in
the notion o f responding relevantly to essential relevance. These values, recall, are those
that are needed to determine both what sorts o f things in the defendant’s life should
qualify as “responding relevantly” to “essential relevance,” e.g., beliefs, values, actions,
etc.; and similarly, which specific beliefs, values, actions, etc. should be used in the
determination o f sanity/insanity. For instance, in the case of Fish, Fingarette seems to
indicate that Fish’s bizarre behavior, i.e., his sticking needles in himself, and cannibalism
are sufficient for exculpation."^" Whereas, under the notion o f appreciating what he was
doing or whether it was wrong, these actions cannot serve to determine that Fish was
sane/insane. This is because, obviously, the notion o f appreciating o f what one was
doing and whether it was wrong pertains to the mental states o f the defendant insofar as
they relate to his ot her perception o f wrongness, as opposed to his physical actions.
Thus, according to Reznek, the considerations o f Fish’s “bizarre behaviors” are the
wrong considerations to determine insanity, and thus, Fish may in fact not be insane.
Hence, to the extent that Fingarette’s test does indeed allow a jury to focus on the above

Ibid.. 184-189.
A lthough the above represents a sim plification o f R eznek’s view s, in that this discussion does not
take into account certain o f R ezn ek ’s more sophisticated points about what motivates our intuitions that
ALI is correct, as opposed to irrationality, the above sim plification is sufficient for the purposes o f this
paper. For R ezn ek’s m ore sophisticated understanding o f why ALI is a better at capturing our intuitions
than irrationality, see pgs. 6 4 -7 4 where Reznek discusses the A s -lf Rule. Otherwise see pgs. 39-40, 174-

188 .
See 4 3 -5 0 above.
S ee sec. Ill, A, ii, 32 above.
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sorts o f broad considerations concerning the “bizarre behavior” of the defendant, and to
the extent that these considerations are misguided insofar as determining criminal
insanity is concerned, then the notion o f appreciating what one was doing and whether it
was wrong depends on less controversial values, than does responding relevantly to
essential relevance does.^^'
A second principal concept that Reznek rejects in criminal insanity jurisprudence, but
this time where Reznek's and Fingarette’s accounts agree, concerns the use o f mental
disease in criminal insanity tests.'^’"* Like Fingarette, Reznek argues that disease (or
mental disease) is a social concept, not a medical one;
It would be attractive to define disease in terms o f something objectively
discoverable.. .But it is a mistake to define disease in terms o f biological
malfunction. Deciding whether something is a disease depends on whether we are
better off without it, not on whether our genes are better off without it. The same
applies to psychiatric conditions.”"^^

More specifically, Reznek argues that the concept o f disease has five distinct features:“^^
( 1). A disease is a process rather than a static defect."^^ (2). A disease does harm."^’^
(3). A disease is an abnormal process.'*^''* (4). A disease is a condition that does not have

See fn. 216.
R eznek. 2 0 4 ,2 1 9 -2 2 2 .
R eznek, pg. 204.
Ibid., 2 0 0 -2 0 4 .
Ibid., 2 0 0 -2 0 1 .
Ibid., 2 0 1 -2 0 2 .
Ibid.. 202.
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an obvious external cause."^” (5). A disease is an involuntary process over which we
have no control.
W hile it is beyond the scope o f this paper to get into a comprehensive analysis o f the
concept o f mental disease, it is sufficient for our purposes to notice the distinctly social
aspect that Reznek finds in the concept. For instance, consider the features o f (2) and (3),
where the concepts of “hann” and “abnormal” are considered by Reznek as necessary for
understanding mental disease. The important thing to notice about these concepts, is that
they are normative in nature, and as such, must be understood in a way that is relative to
various values o f society. For instance, if the context in which “harm” is used, were that
o f “watering one’s flower beds,” then what we might call “harmful” as it relates to the
watering o f plants, concerns the lack o f water that might be given to one’s geraniums.
This is because, obviously, some people like geraniums, and geraniums may die if they
weren’t watered enough. However, with regards to a different plant, say a dandelion, this
same lack o f watering may be construed as a good thing, precisely because it causes the
plant to die, and because we may not like dandelions. Hence, in the same way that a lack
o f watering o f one’s plants can be construed as harmful or good, depending on the social
context in which one is doing the watering, Reznek's analysis o f mental disease reveals
that the considerations are relevant."^* These social considerations are essentially like
those that Fingarette mentions in his analysis, i.e., that mental disease must be understood
against the backdrop o f the criminal law and its purposes.'^ ’

Ibid., 2 0 2 -2 0 3 .
Ibid.
212

Ibid., 2 0 0 -2 0 4 .
S ee sec. Ill, A, ii, 36-38.
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Thus, for Reznek a disease is not simply a medical or factual concept like eye color, or
weight. It is, rather, something that “depends on whether we are better off without it.”
This social analysis o f mental disease is, as was just alluded to, quite similar to
Fingarette’s. Fingarette argues that mental disease is a cross-dimensional concept that
must be understood from the perspective o f the criminal law and its p u r p o s e s . J u s t as
does the notion o f “normal vision” depend on the context in which it is being considered,
so too is this the case with mental disease. Presumably, for Reznek, the above features
(2) and (3) also make it a cross-dimensional concept. This is because, as was mentioned,
the notions o f harm and abnormal must be put in a particular context in order for these
concepts to take on meaning. If this context were that o f the criminal law, then mental
disease would take on a meaning that would depend, as Fingarette says, on the “widely
held ethical-legal notions o f our culture” that are relevant to the determination of moral
responsibility."^’^
Reznek summarizes his position, which ultimately is directed at the debate over the
role that the psychologist should serve in the courtroom, with the following: “The
disease status o f a condition does not determine whether it excuses - this is determined
by whether it causes exculpatory ignorance or compulsion. For this reason, changes in
our disease classification will not influence what we regard as e x c u s e s . H e r e , Reznek
is essentially arguing that because mental disease in the criminal law is not a medical
concept, the psychologist who classifies psychological phenomenon into medical
categories such as “psychosis” and “depression,” would not be in any special sense

Ibid.
Ibid.
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qualified to do so with respect to the concept o f “mental disease” as it is used in the
criminal law. This is because there is no a medical condition known as “mental disease”
that entails that the person is criminal insane.*’’ Instead, mental disease in a legal sense
is a concept that depends on society, and what it considers “harmful” or “abnormal,”
Reznek also argues that a volitional prong is needed in criminal insanity
jurisprudence,"’^ and thus that this concept, which is contained in one form or another in
ALI and the Irresistible Impulse Test, should be preserved.” ’’ The specific version o f the
volitional prong that Reznek argues for, is that a defendant is criminally insane, if he or
she was “unable to control his or her actions.
In order to demonstrate the necessary role that a volitional prong should play in
criminal insanity jurisprudence, Reznek argues that, contrary to Fingarette’s view, there
are clear cases o f criminal insanity that jurors subsume under a volitional concept, rather
then under a cognitive or moral concept."^' Moreover, Reznek argues that as a result o f
these clear examples, we should conclude that losing control is uniquely sufficient for
exculpation."®"
The first example that Reznek uses to illustrate this, is that o f automatism."®’ The
legal definition o f automatism, which comes from Viscount Kilmuir in Bratty’s Appeal,

Ibid., 222.
Ibid.. 2 1 9 -2 2 2 .
Ibid., 74 -8 0 , Ch. 5 generally.
270

A lthough Reznek d oes not exp licitly say this, it can reasonably be inferred from his test. See 309.

Reznek, 309.
Ibid.. 75. 9 3 ,9 5 - 9 6 , 167-168.
Ibid.
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says the following: "

I would prefer to explain automatism simply as action without

any knowledge o f acting, or action with no consciousness o f doing what was being
done.”"^'’ Examples o f automatism, which interestingly, the law has long acknowledged
as providing exculpation,"^^ are epilepsy, somnambulism (or sleepwalking), concussion,
hypoglycemia, and multiple personality."^^ In these cases, particularly in a case o f a
epilepsy, a person’s behavior is the involuntary product o f an underlying abnormal
physical condition, and as such, is clearly not controllable by the agent. Or, in a case like
sleepwalking, if there is not an abnormal physical condition which underlies the
involuntary behavior, the condition is at least known empirically to produce “total
unconsciousness o f what one is doing.” Indeed, when people sleep, they often do not
remember their behaviors, e.g., their coughing, talking, sneezing, eating, or dreaming. In
accordance with these seemingly involuntary behaviors, particularly with a condition like
epilepsy, Reznek argues that automatism provides obvious examples where a defendant
should be found to have an inability to control his or her actions.'^^
Another more interesting sort o f case in which Reznek argues that the need for a
volitional prong can arise in criminal insanity jurisprudence, concerns a case o f
Premenstrual Syndrome (PMS)."^^ Reznek argues “that PMS can dramatically reduce a

’’ Ibid.. 93 -9 8 .
2M

Paul Fenw ick (1 9 9 0 ) ‘A utom atism ’, in R. Bluegrass and P. Bow den teds) Principles and Practice o f
Forensic Psychiatry. London. Churchill Livingstone. 273.
G oldstein, 203; R eznek. 95.
Reznek. 93 -9 6 .
Ibid., 75, 93, 9 5 -9 6 , 167-168.
Ibid.. 167.
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w om an’s capacity to control her impulses,”'*^ and thus that PMS may impair her ability
to resist what, under normal circumstances, she would normally have no problem
resisting. For Reznek, the only thing that explains the fact that we feel that a woman has
a legal excuse when she committed a crime while experiencing PMS, is that she lost
control.‘^° However, Reznek qualifies this by saying that the woman with PMS should
take precautions in order to deal with her weakened resistance levels.*^’ Thus, “being
violent during PMS is much like taking alcohol when you know it will make you
dangerous.”"^* In other words, just because a woman is violent during a PMS phase,
does not mean she has an excuse. Presumably, in a legitimate case o f criminal insanity
where a woman commits a crime while experiencing PMS, certain other factors would be
present in the wom an’s life. These factors might include that she didn’t know that she
had PMS, or she didn’t know what triggered the episodes that caused her to be violent
while she is experiencing PMS, or something o f the like. Nonetheless, as Reznek says,
“there are many cases [such as PMS] where we judge that a person was not in control,
and should be excused.
However, these examples o f automatism and PMS that Reznek argues should be
subsumed under a volitional prong, lead to a more complicated discussion of the
particular volitional prong that Reznek is advocating. As was mentioned in Section II o f
this paper in association with the discussion o f the Irresistible Impulse Test, the

Ibid,
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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notoriously difficult problem o f constructing empirical criteria for determining when this
loss o f control has occurred often arises here.’^** Thus, although these empirical criteria
are much easier to construct in a case like that o f epilepsy, the majority of the cases
where the defendant “loses control,” such as that o f a PMS case, will not admit o f such an
obvious empirical determination.'^^ Consider, for instance, the difference between
someone who is suffering from a grand mal seizure, and someone who acts out o f anger
and “bum s her husband’s bed.”'*^*’ Whereas with the former, there is a wellacknowledged abnormal biological process that is responsible for the loss o f control,
there may not be such an obvious abnormal biological mechanism at work in the latter.
Thus, if Reznek’s version o f the volitional prong were to be employed in the courts, it
appears that there may be difficulty in making a determination in accordance with
empirical principles, even though our intuition may tell us that the person who burned her
husband’s bed has an excuse.
Reznek is well aware o f this empirical difficulty. His suggestion for dealing with this
matter, is what he calls, “fixing the standard circumstances that would constitute reasons
for an actor to do otherwise.”*‘^^ What this means in the abstract, essentially, is that for
the practical purposes o f determining when a person has lost control, Reznek holds that
the courts should, in each particular case, construct a “set o f circumstances” that would
serve as a reason or set o f reasons that should under normal circumstances deter the

S ee sec. II, C, 14 above.
R eznek, 75-92.
Richard J. C e lle s , and Murray S. Straus. Intimate V io len ce. New York; Simon and Schuster 1989,
122.

R eznek. 81-83.
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defendant from doing that which he in fact did, i.e., commit a crime. Then, once these
reasons are given or circumstances are set, the jury has an empirical standard by which to
determine whether or not the defendant was able to control his or her actions with respect
to the crime he committed.'^^
The concrete example that Reznek uses to illustrate the idea o f “fixing the standard
circumstances that would constitute reasons for an actor to do otherwise,” is an example
o f eating cake."^'^ Reznek explains that, if one were to consider eating a piece o f cake, we
might postulate that a sufficient reason for not eating the cake, is that it will produce
heartburn or something similar. That is, we might “fix the standard reasons that would
constitute reasons for an actor to do otherwise” to the fact that the cake will cause
heartburn. But, suppose that one ate the cake anyway. In this situation where the
“standard circumstances” are set broadly, we can conclude that one is “unable to control
his or her behavior” (and is, thus, not responsible). On the other hand, Reznek asks us to
suppose that the cake has cyanide in it. In this situation, the standard circumstances
would be set more narrowly, so that the presence o f cyanide in the cake would represent a
sufficient reason not to eat the cake. Clearly, then, if the person did not resist eating the
cake even though it had cyanide in it, it is reasonable to think that he or she was unable to
control his or her actions, according to Reznek.^””
Now consider this notion o f “fixing the standard circumstances,” as it relates to a
hypothetical rendering o f Fish’s urges to cannibalize children.^®' Suppose, for instance.

2 ox
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that we fix the standard circumstances that would constitute a reason for Fish not to
cannibalize children, to the following proposition: Fish should be able to resist eating
children when someone is at his house. Now suppose that Fish ate the calf o f a young
child when his grandmother was visiting. In accordance with this particular way o f
setting the standard circumstances. Fish could not control his actions. This is because
Fish was not deterred by the standard circumstances that were set in this particular case
(and that we deemed should deter him). However, suppose we set the standard
circumstances more narrowly. In this case, suppose that the standard circumstances that
should cause Fish to do otherwise, are captured by the proposition that, Fish should be
able to resist eating children when his mother is home. In this case, just because Fish ate
the calf o f a young child when his grandmother came to visit, we would have to say that
Fish was in control o f his actions, and thus morally responsible for his behavior. This is
because Fish was not deterred by reasons which we deemed he should have been deterred
by.
So, Reznek suggests that, for the practical purposes o f the court, we set the standard
circumstances somewhere in order to determine when someone cannot resist a certain
action.'’^" In the cake-eating example, most likely we would set the standard
circumstance somewhere in between the two examples. Thus, we would not want to fix
the standard circumstances to “needing to die from eating the cake.” Instead, we would
need to set the standard circumstances somewhere in the middle, perhaps in a case where

S ee Fingarctte's discussion o f Fish in sec. Ill, A. ii, 32. The scenario involving Fish in this paragraph
is used for purely illustrative purposes.
Reznek, 80-91.
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it is obvious that serious harm might result. But, as Reznek says, this will ultimately
depend on our moral point o f view.^^^
The final feature o f Reznek’s test for criminal insanity, which can perhaps be thought
o f as a naturalized version^""* o f the Good-Evil test of 1313/^^ concerns the idea that there
are cases in which the only concepts that properly explain the fact that a defendant is
insane, are those o f “good” and "evil.”^^ Thus, Reznek argues that a defendant is
criminally insane, if he or she “was transformed from a good character into an evil

one:”'»'
The notion o f an evil character is central to the idea o f excuses. Ignorance,
compulsion, and automatism are all excuses because they are ways in which a good
person comes to do something bad. We want to punish evil characters, and want
our excuses to exempt good ones. Hence, these are excuses. The hypothesis is
tested (and in fact suggested) by cases o f insanity.”'»^

As the above passage indicates, Reznek believes that the concept o f an evil character
occupies a deep place in our thinking about criminal insanity. Thus, for Reznek, not only
is the notion o f an evil character needed in order to get the right verdict in certain cases,
but it also represents, in the deepest sense, the most basic o f exculpating conditions.
Reznek says in numerous places, that the volitional, cognitive, and moral concepts that
are contained in the language being “unable to appreciate what he was doing or whether
it was wrong,” and being “unable to control his actions,” all serve in the exculpatory role

Ibid., 82.
’"‘'Ib id .. 13.
S ee sec. II, A. 5 above.
Ibid., 91.
Ibid., 309.
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that they do, because they reflect that the defendant is not an evil character. As Reznek
succinctly puts it, “it is the notion of evil character that best explains why we accept the
excuses that we do."^^"^
However, while Reznek argues that the notion of an evil character best explains M'hy
we accept the excuses that we do, he also argues that the notion o f an evil character is
needed in the courtroom in order to get the just verdict in particular cases. Reznek argues
that the following type o f scenario illustrates the unique and necessary place that the
good/evil prong should play in criminal insanity ju ris p ru d e n c e ° Suppose that a black
man is taunted by a group o f racists. Suppose that if there were a policeman at his elbow,
the black man would not retaliate, and thus the “standard circumstances” would prevent
him from doing so. However, suppose that if there were no police there, then the man
would retaliate against the racist group. In this situation, if we set the standard
circumstances broadly, that is, if we say that to lose control, the black man must attack
the bullies in the presence o f the cop, then black man will almost always be considered be
in control o f his actions, and thus be morally responsible.^" This is because, obviously,
most people in this sort o f a situation would resist such actions. However, if we set the
standard circumstances narrowly, that is, if we say that in order to lose control, the black
man must attack the bullies if his friend is around, then often times individuals will “lose

Ibid., 307.
Ibid., 12.
-'" Ib id .. 91.
Ibid.
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control,” and thus fail to be responsible.'^'^ Reznek argues that both o f these results are
unacceptable. The former is unacceptable, because when the standard circumstances are
set broadly, the black man will be (incorrectly) found to be in control o f his action, and
thus guilty of assault. Whereas, with the latter, if the circumstances are set narrowly, it
will many times be the case that the defendant will be incorrectly found to have lost
control, and thus be NGBI. Similarly, Reznek argues that there seems to be no clear
sense in which the black man “was unable to appreciate what he was doing or whether it
was wrong.”'’'" To the contrary, in a case like this, the black man probably fully
appreciated what he is doing, and might even believe that it is right. For Reznek, this
case is one in which the defendant should have an excuse, and where the only test that
will consistently capture our understanding of this excuse, is one in which “abnormal
circumstances induces a temporary change in character.’” '’*
Other examples where Reznek argues that the person has an excuse of this sort, will
come from those cases in which an individual fails to satisfy the loss o f control rule, and
where the person does not fall under the requirement that he or she is “unable to
appreciate what he was doing or whether it was wrong.” Reznek argues that the example
o f a psychotically depressed mother, much like that o f Andrea Yates, who kills her
children because she believes they are better off dead, fits this profile.’'" Thus, Reznek
argues that, on a reasonable interpretation, a woman such as this was “able to appreciate
what she was doing and whether it was wrong,” and moreover, that there were no

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 92.
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circumstances that would justify an appeal to loss o f control. Reznek argues that the only
way to justify this sort o f case, is through the idea that the woman is a good person, but
through her illness, was turned into a bad person temporarily.^'^
Finally, consider the category o f defendant that Reznek mentions who is paranoid and
believes that he or she is being persecuted, and decides to kill in retaliation.^'^ Again,
cases that are in this category, represent situations in which the person is not out o f
control, and similarly does not satisfy the “appreciation o f what he was doing or whether
it was wrong” prong. But, Reznek argues that “nevertheless, from M ’N aghten onwards,,
such mentally ill offenders have been seen as paradigmatic cases of insanity.”^ T h u s ,
Reznek argues, our common sense intuition tells us that, there should be another excuse
besides those o f loss o f control and “an inability to appreciate what one was doing or
whether it was wrong.” This excuse is that the defendant is “transformed from a good
character into an evil one.”
In summary, we can see that Reznek both affirms and denies various parts of the
traditional tests for criminal insanity. Similarly, there are distinct senses in which
R eznek's account is both compatible and incompatible with that o f Fingarette’s. Where
Reznek and Fingarette agree about the meaning o f criminal insanity, is, first, in their
rejection o f a mental disease prong found in M ’N aghten, Durham, and ALI.''^' This is
because, contrary to the medical meaning that the courts assign to mental disease, Reznek
and Fingarette argue that mental disease is a social concept. A second aspect o f the

Ibid.
■ Ibid.
Ibid.
S ee 3 6 -3 8 , 56-59 above.
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traditional tests that both agree about, concerns the rejection of those concepts in
traditional insanity tests which do not have sufficient noncognitive connotations/"^
These include the central concepts o f “know” and “understand” that are found in
M 'Naghten. Instead, both theorists choose to employ a different set of concepts to
convey the relevant noncognitive applications as well. In Reznek s case, it is the notion
o f appreciate that is found in ALI, whereas for Fingarette it is his own unique notion of
criminal irrationality.^"’
However, as w e’ve seen, their accounts differ with respect to a number o f other issues.
The most fundamental difference, concerns certain basic concepts that they believe give
the necessary and sufficient conditions o f criminal insanity. Whereas Fingarette holds
that criminal irrationality as he defines it provides both the necessary and sufficient
conditions for criminal insanity, Reznek holds that Fingarette’s notion of criminal
irrationality is irrelevant to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T h i s is because, first, the notion o f
“responding relevantly to essential relevance” rests on a controversial objective value
hierarchy that allows far too many criminals to qualify for exculpation, perhaps even all
criminals. Second, that there are counterexamples to the different senses in which the
notion o f “criminal irrationality” might be interpreted, i.e., both cognitively and
noncognitively. Instead, Reznek proposes that we rely on more traditional concepts in
criminal insanity jurisprudence, than those o f Fingarette’s. These include, a volitional
prong that is found in the Irresistible Impulse Test and ALL ’" ’ These also include, the

See 2 8 -2 9 , 4 6 -5 0 above.
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concepts o f appreciation and wrongness, which can be found in ALI and M ’N aghten,
r e s p e c t i v e l y . F i n a l l y , Reznek holds that a morally correct insanity test must include
the concepts o f good and evil, which originally were used in the Good-Evil Test of
1812.-^^'“^ In short, Reznek argues that in certain cases o f criminal insanity, these good and
evil concepts are the only ones that will allow a jury to reasonably reach a correct
understanding o f moral responsibility in some cases.
IV Conclusion
The purpose o f this paper was to analyze two philosophers’ perspectives on criminal
insanity, in the hopes o f finding better alternatives than that offered by the state o f Texas
for dealing with controversial cases such as the one involving Andrea Yates. ’"'’ This
analysis was carried out from a five-part perspective which involved the role that the
concepts o f mental disease, volition, rationality, legal/moral, and cognitive/noncognitive
should play in criminal insanity jurisprudence. In Section II, I attempted, through an
explication o f the conceptual history o f the insanity defense, to reveal some of the
problems that have characteristically given rise to these five issues. In Section III, I
attempted to present the revisionist perspectives o f Herbert Fingarette and Lawrie Reznek
in the context o f this conceptual history. Now, 1 will apply their tests for criminal
insanity to the Andrea Yates case, which is a fairly easy and straightforward application.
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because both theorists have already tested their views against a case that is much like that
o f Yates.
As was mentioned earlier in this paper,’"* Fingarette applied his test for insanity to
the case o f a woman with post-partum depression. This woman might as well have been
Andrea Yates. Recall that in the case that Fingarette described, like Yates, the woman
with post-partum depression began to have destructive, infanticidal thoughts after the
birth o f her first child. However, like Yates, this woman did not act on these psychotic
thoughts. It w asn’t until after the birth o f her second child that the thoughts “took over,”
after which time the woman strangled her child.’"^ In Yates’ case, it was, o f course, after
the birth o f her fifth child that Yates drowned all five o f her children.
Fingarette argued that a defendant such as Yates should have an excuse.” ® However,
he also argued that, it is reasonable to suppose that a defendant like Yates “purposefully,”
“voluntarily,” and “knowingly” strangled the child, and thus that M'Naghten^ ALI, and,
o f course, the narrower Right-Wrong test that Texas uses, would not provide such an
excuse.” ' In this sense, Yates “knew” or “appreciated” that what she did was contrary to
the law and wrong. W hen Yates called her husband and the police, quite cognizant that
all o f her children were dead, it appeared that Yates “knew and appreciated the nature and
quality o f the act and that it was against the law and wrong.” It also appeared that Yates
voluntarily chose to murder her children in the sense that she was well aware o f her

Fingarette. 140-141: Reznek, 233.
S ee sec. Ill, A, ii, 3 3 -3 5 , above.
Ibid,
Fingarette, 140-141.
.131

Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

74

destructive infanticidal thoughts, and she had ample opportunity to put herself in a
hospital, or to get some help elsewhere. Moreover, Yates had resisted acting on these
thoughts after the birth o f earlier children, and so based on these empirical observations,
it is reasonable to suppose that Yates did not lose control.
However, according to Fingarette’s test, Yates would indeed lack a substantial
capacity to respond relevantly to essential relevance. This was because, in the language
that was used earlier,^” Yates simply did not respond in ways that are considered
appropriate to those aspects o f her life that a sane and moral person would. She did not,
for instance, respond with a rational set o f beliefs to the voices that she heard from the
devil. Her response, to drown her five children in the midst o f these voices, was deeply
irrational. Her being overcome by post-partum depression to such an extent that she
could have let her thoughts and emotions “take over," was simply bizarre, horrific, and
improper in the extreme. Under our norms constituting what sane behavior should look
like, and how sane people should respond to certain aspects of their life that are relevant
to criminality, Yates’ behavior was “grossly irrational.” She would be found NGBl in
accordance with Fingarette’s test.
While reaching the same verdict, Reznek would analyze the Yates case differently
than would F i n g a r e t t e . W h i l e Reznek would agree with some o f Fingarette’s o f the
conclusions, he would reach these conclusions for different reasons. Regarding the
volitional prong, Reznek argued that a psychotically depressed mother such as Yates is

S ee Intro, above.
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often an example o f an actor who cannot reasonably be considered to lose control.
That is, in a similar manner as above, Reznek would hold that there are no empirical set
o f circumstances that would justify the determination that Yates lost control. She knew
about her psychotic condition for many years, and could have dealt with it professionally.
She resisted such infanticidal temptations with earlier births. She thought a great deal
about doing what she did before she did it. She would not satisfy Reznek’s loss of
control rule.
Reznek would also argue that Yates did in fact appreciate what she was doing and that
it was w r o n g . T h u s , according to this criterion o f Reznek, Yates should be found
guilty o f first-degree murder. In the same manner as was discussed with Fingarette, it is
reasonable to suppose that Yates did appreciate what she was doing and that it was
wrong, in the sense that Yates' execution o f her children seemed calculated (e.g., her
laying her children in a neat row on the bed). Similarly, as was mentioned, she called
both her husband and the police to report the case right after the murders, suggesting that
she appreciated how society would perceive such actions.
For Reznek, the only test that can justify our intuitive sense that Yates should have
been found criminally insane, is that she was “a good person who temporarily became
evil.”-^’’ Indeed, Yates does seem to fit this profile. Often times she was a good mother
and wife. Yates was a valedictorian o f her graduating class. She had many friends. She
was likeable. She seemed, in general, to be “a well-meaning person." But. under the grip
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o f mental illness, Reznek argues that good people can temporarily become evil. Clearly,
Yates would fit this profile, and should be found NGBL
Though not immune from criticism, the revisionist perspectives of Reznek and
Fingarette get the right verdict in the Yates case. Therefore, they provide, in this case, a
better alternative to Texas’ test for criminal insanity, which is too narrow. What the
criminal law needs is a broader, more liberal test for criminal insanity than that o f at least
Texas’ 2iné M 'Naghten, and most likely ALI as well. This is because, these tests do not
satisfy our understanding o f a morally correct conception o f criminal insanity. Although
jurors, when deciding cases o f criminal insanity, can always choose to subsume their
understanding o f moral responsibility under more narrow conceptions than those of
Reznek and Fingarette, the chances o f them may be reduced. In other words, often the
specific conception o f criminal insanity does matter. In the case o f Andrea Yates, a
broader test for criminal insanity would most likely result in her being sent to a hospital
instead o f a prison.
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